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ABSTRACT
The Ethereum Decentralized Autonomous Organization ("The DAO"),
a decentralized, smart-contract-based investment fund with assets of $168 mil-
lion, spectacularly crashed when one of its members exploited a flaw in its
computer code and siphoned off $55 million. In the wake of the exploit, many
argued that participants in The DAO could be jointly and severally liable for
the loss as partners in a general partnership. Others claimed that The DAO
evidenced an entirely new form of business entity, one that current laws do not
contemplate. Ultimately, the technologists cleaned up the exploit by restructur-
ing the computer code, and without engaging in any further legal analysis,
many simply concluded that The DAO, other decentralized autonomous or-
ganizations, and the Ethereum protocol itself signify opportunities to do away
with legal business-organizational forms as they presently exist. In this Article,
I argue that precisely the opposite is true. Instead of creating a new type of
corporate entity through computer code, The DAO and other smart-contract-
based organizations may resurrect a very old, frequently forgotten business
entity-the business trust-which Rockefeller used to solve the technol-
ogy-business organization law divide of his time.
This Article offers the first analysis of blockchain-based business ventures
under business organization law at three separate levels of the technology:
protocols, smart contracts, and decentralized autonomous organizations. The
Article first reveals the practical and theoretical deficits of using partnership as
the only common-law entity option for blockchain-based business ventures.
The Article then demonstrates that incorporation and limited liability com-
pany ("LLC") formation will also pose both practical and doctrinal difficul-
ties for some such businesses. When faced with a similar conundrum in the
19th century, Rockefeller turned to the common-law business trust as a substi-
tute business entity. This Article argues that if Rockefeller were a coder build-
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ing a blockchain-based business, he would again turn to the business trust as
his choice of entity. The Article concludes by considering, in light of Rockefel-
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INTRODUCTION
A 23-year-old business man in Cleveland, Ohio, began a journey
in 1860 that would reshape the landscape for legally recognized busi-
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ness organizations., John D. Rockefeller, known for savvy negotia-
tion, diligent saving, and smart investments2 began his oil business as
a partnership, Rockefeller and Andrews, in 1860.3 As the business
profited, expanded, and garnered outside investors, Rockefeller incor-
porated the Standard Oil Company as an Ohio corporation in June of
1870.4 Cleveland, the base of Rockefeller's operations, sat at the
center of transportation technology-"By rail and water Cleveland
commanded the entire Western market. It had two trunk lines running
to New York, . . . and by Lake Erie and the canal it had for a large
part of the year a splendid cheap waterway."5 Rockefeller cleverly
used those technologies in order to drive a price advantage in his
products over his competitors.6 Furthermore, improvements in com-
munications technology and new production technology for distilling
petroleum allowed Rockefeller to reduce production costs in areas
other than transportation.7
Pushed to creativity by these technology innovations, at the end
of 1871, Rockefeller connected with oil refiners in Pennsylvania.8 To-
gether, they began setting the stage for a large industry merger that
would give the resulting company a competitive advantage and enable
it to exert some control over prices.9 At the time, Rockefeller needed
to choose one of three business forms to serve as the surviving entity:
"simple combinations, pools, and corporations."10 Simple combina-
tions and pools were contract-based combinations that suffered from a
number of logistical difficulties." As a result, Rockefeller first at-
tempted to integrate the industry by incorporating the Southern Im-
1 1 IDA M. TARBELL, THE HISTORY OF THE STANDARD OIL CoMPANY 39-43 (Peter
Smith reprt. 1967) (1904).
2 Id. at 40-43.
3 Id. at 43.
4 Id. at 44, 276.
5 Id. at 38; see also Wayne D. Collins, Trusts and the Origins of Antitrust Legislation, 81
FoRDHAM L. REv. 2279, 2282 (2013) ("A rapidly expanding transportation network and declin-
ing real freight rates made it increasingly possible and economical to reliably ship products over
long distances for distribution and sale. This, in turn, enlarged the effective geographic area a
single firm could serve from its local vicinity to regional or even national markets.").
6 TARBELL, supra note 1, at 45-47.
7 Collins, supra note 5, at 2283-86.
8 TARBELL, supra note 1, at 54-55.
9 Id.
10 Collins, supra note 5, at 2292.
11 A simple combination is just an agreement among firms with "simple terms, such as not
selling below a certain price, producing above a certain level, or allocating customers or sales
territories to particular participating firms." I at 2293. Pools are a special type of contractual
combination. Id. at 2307. "What makes pools unique is that they aggregate some common attrib-
utes related to production, typically profits or output, and then reallocate the common factor to
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provement Company.12 Unfortunately, the general corporation laws
of the time restricted companies in ways unsuitable to large business
combinations.13 Thus, although the technology existed to fulfill Rock-
efeller's vision of integration in the oil refinery industry, to truly reap
the potential benefits, Rockefeller needed to overcome the limitations
of the corporate form of his time. In 1882, Rockefeller fully unveiled
his solution: the Standard Oil Trust.14 Rockefeller organized the Stan-
dard Oil Trust as a business trust.5 In a business trust, one or more
trustees hold property on behalf of, and manage the property for the
benefit of, the beneficiaries.1 6 Doing so allowed the Standard Oil Trust
to act as one large company, coordinating activity in the oil refining
industry across a large geographic area, something the corporation
laws of the time did not allow.' 7
The story of the Standard Oil Trust reveals that technological
change often powers the evolutionary history of legally recognized
the pool members in agreed proportions, independently of what any individual firm may have
actually contributed." Id.
12 TARBELL, supra note 1, at 56.
13 Collins, supra note 5, at 2312. First, businesses incorporated under general corporation
statutes were "subject to low capitalization limitations." Id. Second, corporation statutes gener-
ally limited the existence of corporations to 25 years. Id. at 2312-13. Third, the general corpora-
tion statutes of Rockefeller's day generally limited the amount of money corporations could
borrow to the corporation's capital stock and withheld limited liability in certain circumstances.
Id. at 2313. Other restrictions included prohibitions on corporations conducting out-of-state bus-
iness and the ability of some states to revoke corporate charters as they saw fit. Id.
14 JOHN MICKLETHWArr & ADRIAN WOOLDRIDGE, THE COMPANY 67 (2003) ("In 1882,
the Standard Oil alliance, a loose federation of forty companies, each with its own legal and
administrative identity (to satisfy individual state laws) metamorphosed into the Standard Oil
Trust."); Collins, supra note 5, at 2315 ("The necessary legal innovation for large multistate com-
binations came in 1879 with the creation of the original Standard Oil Trust, which was rewritten
in 1882."); Frederick H. Cooke, Trust and Anti-Trust Legislation, 7 AM. LAw. 236, 237 (1899)
(explaining use of the business trust "dates from the organization of what is known as the Stan-
dard Oil Trust, the original, and in many respects, a typical trust. It was formally organized in
1882, though existing informally, so to speak, some years previously."). The trust agreements,
both original and rewritten, are reprinted in INDUSTRIAL COMBINATIONS AND TRUSTS 14-26
(William S. Stevens ed., 1913).
15 See MICKLETHWAIT & WOOLDRIDGE, supra note 14, at 67; Cooke, supra note 14, at 237;
2 IDA M. TARBELL, THE HISTORY OF THE STANDARD OIL COMPANY 135, 364-73 (Peter Smith
reprt. 1967) (1904).
16 Collins, supra note 5, at 2315; see also infra notes 190-218 and accompanying text. "Ap-
plied to the world of business, the trust, like a corporation, is a vehicle in which a large number
of individuals can aggregate their resources in order to create and manage a large enterprise,
with the trustees acting much like the directors of a corporation." Collins, supra note 5, at
2315-16.
17 Collins, supra note 5, at 2319; Cooke, supra note 14, at 237 ("These trustees were thus
enabled to control these previously independent properties as a unit, their position being analo-
gous to that of trustees or directors of a corporation.").
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business organizations. Although the antitrust movement's and the
enactment of general incorporation statutes provided the corporate
form we still use today,19 new technology-such as the internet and
platform technology-and new business philosophies-such as those
found in the Sharing Economy-continue to push the boundaries of
that corporate form.20 This Article focuses on a specific new technol-
ogy, distributed ledger technology ("DLT"), 2 1 and investigates its
place in the evolution of business organization law. Specifically, this
Article argues that business ventures undertaken entirely through
DLT, often through decentralized autonomous organizations
("DAOs") 22 and smart contracts,23 chafe against today's general incor-
poration statutes in the same ways that companies like the Standard
Oil Trust once chafed against older versions of state incorporation
statutes. As a result, this Article considers how business ventures liv-
ing on the blockchain can harness the flexibility of the business trust
18 Concerned about the mass of wealth and power accumulated by the very successful
Standard Oil Trust and other business trusts of the time, Congress passed the Sherman Antitrust
Act of 1890. See Herbert Hovenkamp, The Antitrust Movement and the Rise of Industrial Organ-
ization, 68 TEX. L. REv. 105, 105 (1989).
19 State governments sought to decrease the attractiveness of the business-trust form by
introducing the more flexible general incorporation statutes still in use today. Collins, supra note
5, at 2329-33; see also MICKLETHWAIT & WOOLDRIDGE, supra note 14, at 68 ("By 1901, two-
thirds of all American firms with $10 million or more of capital were incorporated in the state [of
New Jersey], allowing New Jersey to run a budget surplus of almost $3 million by 1905 and
paying for a rash of new public works."). The Standard Oil Trust itself reorganized as a New
Jersey holding company in 1899. Collins, supra note 5, at 2334. Ultimately, in 1911, the Supreme
Court used the Sherman Act to order the dissolution of the Standard Oil Trust's corporate form.
See Standard Oil Co. of N.J. v. United States, 221 U.S. 1, 81 (1911); see also James A. Dalton &
Louis Esposito, Standard Oil and Predatory Pricing: Myth Paralleling Fact, 38 REV. INDUs. ORG.
245, 245 (2011).
20 See generally, e.g., Henry Hansmann, Reinier Kraakman & Richard Squire, The New
Business Entities in Evolutionary Perspective, 2005 U. ILL. L. REv. 5 (explaining restrictions on
the corporate form began to be relaxed in the early 19th century, making the form increasingly
suitable for various types and sizes of enterprises); J. Haskell Murray, The Social Enterprise Law
Market, 75 MD. L. REV. 541 (2016) (outlining how over 30 states have passed social-enterprise
statutes, which allow the formation of many new types of entities).
21 This Article uses the term "DLT" to refer to "computer software that is distributed,
runs on peer-to-peer networks, and offers a transparent, verifiable, tamper-resistant transaction-
management system maintained through a consensus mechanism rather than by a trusted third-
party intermediary that guarantees execution." Carla L. Reyes, Conceptualizing Cryptolaw, 96
NEB. L. REv. 384, 390-91 (2017) (footnotes omitted). For a further description of what DLT is
and how it works, see infra notes 27-43 and accompanying text.
22 DAOs are distributed, peer-to-peer computer software that incorporate governance and
decisionmaking rules. For a deeper explanation, see infra notes 68-88 and accompanying text.
23 A smart contract is computer code that is designed to write a state change to the under-
lying protocol upon the fulfillment of certain predetermined conditions. See infra notes 44-66
and accompanying text.
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in the same way as the technological giants of old. Doing so will allow
such business ventures to enjoy the benefits of limited liability, perpet-
ual existence, and legal personhood while retaining a large measure of
flexibility to explore new organizational structures and economic
models.
This Article offers the first theory of how business organization
law applies to three different levels of the DLT ecosystem: the DLT
protocol level, the smart contract level, and the DAO level. The first
of a several-article series exploring the jurisprudential impact of DLT-
based business entities,24 this Article proceeds in four Parts. Part I in-
troduces the technology that makes it possible to create asset-owning
organizations out of computer code. Part II demonstrates, at each
level of the DLT ecosystem (protocol, smart contracts, and DAOs),
that although treatment as a corporation or LLC offers significant
benefits from a policy perspective, neither form fits well for both prac-
tical and theoretical reasons fundamental to business organization
law. Part II further argues that treatment as a partnership, the default
option, imposes such inexplicable results on some DLT-based business
ventures, which this Article refers to as Distributed Business Entities
("DBEs"), that they need another business entity option. Part III then
argues that the common-law business trust (or the "Massachusetts
trust")2 offers an alternative common-law form of business organiza-
24 In the second article, I explore the implications of legally recognized business entities
for the governance of DLT protocols. The second article weighs in on debates regarding fiduci-
ary obligations of certain actors in DLT protocols and the impact of legally recognized DLT-
based business entities on DLT culture, among others. In the third article, I hope to explore the
implications of legally recognized blockchain-based businesses for understanding the corporate
personhood doctrine.
25 This Article uses "business trust" to refer to the business organization known as either
the business trust or the Massachusetts trust. See Herbert B. Chermside, Jr., Annotation, Mod-
ern Status of the Massachusetts or Business Trust, 88 A.L.R. 3d 704, § 1[a] (1978). These business
organizations are referred to in this way because "such organizations are created under the com-
mon law of contracts and do not depend upon any statute." Id. § 2 n.4 (citing Schumann-Heink
v. Folsom, 159 N.E. 250 (1927)). The term "statutory trust" also frequently surfaces in the litera-
ture. See, e.g., Peter B. Oh, Business Trusts, in RESEARCH HANDBOOK ON PARTNERSHIPs, LLCs
AND ALTERNATIVE Foms or BusINEss ORGANIZATIONS 268, 270-73 (Robert W. Hillman &
Mark J. Loewenstein eds., 2015). The term "statutory trusts" refers to those business trusts rec-
ognized by state statute. Some statutory trust statutes require registration of the entity; others,
like the Delaware Business Trust Act, do not. Tamar Frankel, The Delaware Business Trust Act
Failure as the New Corporate Law, 23 CARDOzO L. REv. 325, 326 nn.4-5 (2001). As this Article
uses the term "business trust," it is intended to include those statutory trusts in which the statute
merely recognizes the common-law business trust but does not require registration. Like Profes-
sor Bayern's artificial intelligence-operated LLC, however, a DBE "incorporator" could file the
necessary paperwork in states that so require. Nevertheless, the common-law business trust re-
mains the focus of this Article as a business organization form for DBEs that does not require
[Vol. 87:373378
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tion for certain DLT protocols, smart-contract arrangements, and
DAOs. 26 The business-trust form avoids the irregular results of the
partnership while simultaneously providing the rights and responsibili-
ties of corporations. Viewing this argument through a historical lens,
Part IV reveals that the emergence of the business trust as a form of
business organization in the DLT context should be entirely expected.
Part IV also argues that, in light of history, the law should anticipate
certain concerns to arise as blockchain-based business trusts emerge.
I. A SMART CONTRACT AND DECENTRALIZED AUTONOMOUS
ORGANIZATION PRIMER
To enable an in-depth discussion of the implications of DLT for
business organization law, this Article begins with a brief introduction
to DLT,27 smart contracts, and DAOs. This Article uses the term
"DLT" to refer generally to "computer software that is distributed,
runs on peer-to-peer networks, and offers a transparent, verifiable,
tamper-resistant ransaction-management system maintained through
a consensus mechanism rather than by a trusted third-party intermedi-
ary that guarantees execution."28 DLT protocols are distributed and
affirmative state filings. See Shawn J. Bayern, The Implications of Modern Business-Entity Law
for the Regulation of Autonomous Systems, 19 STAN. TECH. L. REv. 93, 101 (2015).
26 Technically, this means that certain decentralized autonomous applications will consti-
tute common-law business trusts, as DAOs are a specific type of decentralized autonomous ap-
plication. This subtle distinction will be explored further below in Part III.
27 William Mougayar, a blockchain investor and writer, assures his readers that although
"[tioday, we're saying blockchain does this or that, . . . tomorrow blockchains will be rather
invisible; we will talk more about what they enable." WILLIAM MOUGAYAR, THE BusINeSs
BLOCKCHAIN, at xxiv (2016). This is true for the internet; "the average consumer now takes the
internet for granted, even if they know nearly nothing about how it works." John 0. McGinnis &
Kyle Roche, Bitcoin: Order Without Law in the Digital Age 24 (Nw. Pub. Law Research Paper
No. 17-06, 2017), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract id=2929133 [https://perma.cc/
ZDE9-DXPA]. As a result, scholars writing about legal issues arising because of the internet no
longer begin every article they write with an explanation of what the internet is and how it
works. See, e.g., Bryan H. Choi, The Anonymous Internet, 72 MD. L. REv. 501 (2013); Nizan
Geslevich Packin, Too-Big-to-Fail 2.0? Digital Service Providers as Cyber-Social Systems, 93 IND.
L.J. (forthcoming 2018). Perhaps when Mougayar's tomorrow arrives, I will no longer feel obli-
gated to start each article with a description of DLT and how it works. Until that day, however, a
brief definition and description remains warranted. Because I have previously written detailed
explanations of how DLT works, see Reyes, supra note 21, at 390-96, and Carla L. Reyes, Mov-
ing Beyond Bitcoin to an Endogenous Theory of Decentralized Ledger Technology Regulation:
An Initial Proposal, 61 VILL. L. REv. 191, 196-202 (2016), and because the broader explanation
of DLT is less important for the purposes of this Article than understanding smart contracts and
DAOs, the explanation of DLT that follows is particularly brief.
28 Reyes, supra note 21, at 390-91 (footnotes omitted). I am aware of the ongoing debate
as to appropriate terminology, and, in particular, the discussion around the terms "blockchain"
versus "DLT." Without intending to weigh in on the substance of that debate, I adopt the term
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peer-to-peer29 because each computer that downloads and runs the
software connects to several other computers to make the software
work.30 This means that each party with the software can access the
full ledger and its history, and can send information directly to other
nodes, without going through an intermediary.31 DLT is transparent
because "[e]very transaction and its associated value are visible to an-
yone with access to the system."32 DLT protocols offer auditability
and tamper-resistance because the protocol tracks the transitions be-
tween state33 that occur with each new transaction3 using some com-
"DLT" because it is the broader term, encompassing both permissioned and permissionless
blockchains, as well as protocols such as R3's Corda that do not strictly fit the definition of a
"chain of blocks." Adopting this term is not a statement about the technical accuracy of this or
any other terminology. I use it, as a legal academic, grounded in the premise that all of these
protocols exist and are in use, and that any legal and policy discussion of such systems must
account for the full range of implementations. For further insight into my position, see id.; see
also MOUGAYAR, supra note 27, at 7 (concurring and explaining that "[s]ince the Internet is
comprised of a public version and several private variations, blockchains will also follow that
path. Therefore, we will have public and private blockchains. Some will be natively bolted to a
blockchain, whereas others might be a hybrid implementation that is part of an existing Web or
private application."); Tim Swanson, A Brief History of R3-the Distributed Ledger Group,
GREAT WALL NUMBERS (Feb. 27, 2017), http://www.ofnumbers.com/2017/02/27/a-brief-history-
of-r3-the-distributed-ledger-group/ [https://perma.cclSW3T-7YZE].
29 Patrick Murck, Who Controls the Blockchain?, HARV. Bus. REv. (Apr. 19, 2017), https:/
/hbr.org/2017/04/who-controls-the-blockchain [https://perma.cc/8Q58-6P2V]; see MOUGAYAR,
supra note 27, at 23 ("Architecturally, the base layer of the blockchain is a peer-to-peer net-
work."); DON TAPSCOTr & ALEX TAPSCOTT, BLOCKCHAIN REVOLUTION 6 (2016) ("Each
blockchain, like the one that uses bitcoin, is distributed: it runs on computers provided by volun-
teers around the world; there is no central database to hack."); Shawn Bayern, Of Bitcoins,
Independently Wealthy Software, and the Zero-Member LLC, 108 Nw. U. L. REV. ONLINE 257,
259 (2014) ("Bitcoin is a peer-to-peer software system, which means, practically speaking, that the
entire system is made up of versions of the software that end-users download and run on their
personal computers. There is no Bitcoin server or Bitcoin company that directly manages the
system.").
30 See ANDREAS M. ANTONOPOULOS, MASTERING BrrcoIN 25 (2d ed. 2017).
31 MOUGAYAR, supra note 27, at 23; TAPscorr & TAPscorr, supra note 29, at 6; Bayern,
supra note 29, at 259; Murck, supra note 29.
32 Murck, supra note 29.
33 In technical terms, a state just means "stored information" at a specific point in
time. A state machine is a computer or device that remembers the status of some-
thing at a given instant in time. Based on some inputs, that status might change, and
it provides a resulting output for these implemented changes. Keeping track of
transitions of these states is important and that's what the blockchain does well,
and in a way that is immutable.
MOUGAYAR, supra note 27, at 24; see also HENNING DIEDRICH, ETHEREUM 33 (2016) (explain-
ing that "state" refers to "all or part of the data that a program deals with").
34 DIEDRICH, supra note 33, at 33 (explaining that in the Ethereum protocol "every trans-
action that was ever made, every contract that was ever invoked, is re-lived by your client"); see
also TAPscoTr & TAPsco-rr, supra note 29, at 7 ("So the blockchain is a distributed ledger
representing a network consensus of every transaction that has ever occurred."); Kevin Werbach
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bination of three elements of cryptography science (hashes,35
cryptographic signatures,36 and a consensus mechanism37) to secure38
& Nicolas Cornell, Contracts Ex Machina, 67 DuKE L.J. 313, 327 (2017) ("Anyone can view a
Bitcoin's blockchain, and trace back transactions all the way to the original 'genesis block' cre-
ated by Nakamoto."). Different DLT protocols approach the method of achieving its purpose as
a "state machine" differently.
In the [Bitcoin] blockchain, the transition history is a persistent part of the informa-
tion about that state. In the Ethereum blockchain, a distinct "state tree" is stored,
representing the current balance of each address, and a "transaction list" represent-
ing the transactions between the current block and previous blocks in each block.
MOUGAYAR, supra note 27, at 24.
35 DIEDRICH, supra note 33, at 107-08 ("Hashes are used as if they were unique identifi-
ers. . . . And with a hash you have a useful id of anything in Cypherspace that kind of points
backwards: you will know that it's the right [identifier ("id")] when you see what it points to, the
original text. This id does not help you to find the text. And that's a feature. But once you see
the text later, you have proof that someone meant that text and no other when they gave you the
id.").
One-way hash functions are a cryptographic construct used in many applica-
tions. They are used with public-key algorithms for both encryption and digital
signatures....
One-way hash functions . . . have two properties. One, they're one-way. This
means that it's easy to take a message and compute the hash value, but it's impossi-
ble to take a hash value and re-create the original message. (By "impossible," I
mean "can't be done in any reasonable amount of time.") Two, they're collision-
free. This means that it's impossible to find two messages that hash to the same
hash value.
Bruce Schneier, Cryptanalysis of MD5 and SHA: Time for a New Standard, SCHNEIER ON SE-
CURTY (Aug. 19, 2004), https://www.schneier.comlessays/archives/2004/08/cryptanalysis-ofmd5
.html [https://perma.cc/JC7U-WYJN].
36 DIEDRICH, supra note 33, at 35 (explaining that in Ethereum, "every computation exe-
cuted on the blockchain is by a signed program, too, as all code on the blockchain-i.e. the
transaction scripts themselves-are deployed to the blockchain as signed input parameters to a
transaction"); see also TAPSCOTT & TAPscorr, supra note 29, at 39 ("Satoshi required partici-
pants to use public key infrastructure (PKI) for establishing a secure platform. PKI is an ad-
vanced form of 'asymmetric' cryptography, where users get two keys that don't perform the
same function: one is for encryption and one for decryption."); Carla L. Reyes, Nizan Geslevich
Packin & Benjamin P. Edwards, Distributed Governance, 59 WM. & MARY L. REV. ONLINE 1, 5
(2017) (noting transactions on DLT are cryptographically signed).
37 "Consensus means that nodes agree on the same world state." DIEDRICH, supra note 33,
at 142. The most well-known consensus mechanism is the proof-of-work consensus used by the
Bitcoin blockchain. TAPscoTr & TAPscor-r, supra note 29, at 31 ("To achieve consensus, the
bitcoin network uses what's called a proof of work (PoW) mechanism."). Commonly referred to
as "mining," proof-of-work is the process by which
Bitcoin nodes repeatedly attempt to solve cryptographic hashing puzzles based on
the transactions in a proposed new block on the blockchain. These puzzles are on a
sliding level of difficulty so that, roughly every ten minutes, a random node finds a
solution. The new block based on that solution is broadcast across the network.
Other nodes, after checking for validity, add the new block to the blockchain....
The node that successfully proposes the new block receives a financial reward.
Werbach & Cornell, supra note 34, at 328 (footnotes omitted).
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and verify 3 9 transactions.4 0 The combination of these three elements
vary by implementation among various DLT protocols,4 1 but the out-
come remains the same. Ultimately, irrespective of the combination of
features used, DLT software protocols allow "[c]onnected computers
[to] reach agreement over shared data."4 2
DLT protocols "can incorporate limited programmable logic into
transactions."4 3 This enables software programmers to design more
complex transactions, including decentralized applications and decen-
tralized autonomous organizations. Smart contracts act as the building
blocks of these more complex transactions and programs. The remain-
der of this Part offers an introduction to smart contracts and then ex-
amines the early decentralized autonomous organizations that
emerged using smart contracts.
38 DIEDRICH, supra note 33, at 34 ("[Tlhe outcome of the world state is indisputable and
trustworthy because every transaction that comes in and triggers a change to the world state is
cryptographically signed by the account owner that the transaction originates from."); Shawn Bay-
ern, Dynamic Common Law and Technological Change: The Classification of Bitcoin, 71 WASH.
& LEE L. REV. Owur 22, 24 (2014) (noting bitcoin transactions are secure because "transmit-
ting bitcoins requires knowledge of their 'secret key,' a number that it is statistically impossible
to guess").
39 DIEDRICH, supra note 33, at 104 ("When you digitally sign something, the algorithms
involved make it easy to check for others that the signature was really made by you. But virtually
impossible for others to create such signature, without knowing your random choices.").
40 Reyes, Packin & Edwards, supra note 36, at 9 (describing, in detail, the three elements).
41 There are, for example, any number of different ways to achieve consensus. Ethereum
currently uses proof-of-work, but the Ethereum development team has considered moving to
proof-of-stake consensus. Alyssa Hertig, Ethereum's Big Switch: The New Roadmap to Proof-of-
Stake, CoINDESK (updated May 16, 2017), https://www.coindesk.com/ethereums-big-switch-the-
new-roadmap-to-proof-of-stake/ [https://perma.cc/7JUQ-H8UV]. Ripple and Stellar use "a
unique node list of at least one hundred nodes they can trust in voting on the state of affairs."
TAPscoTT & TA-Pscorr, supra note 29, at 57 (emphasis omitted). There are other mechanisms as
well, including proof-of-activity, proof-of-capacity, and proof-of-storage. Id. DLT protocols may
also vary in what activity must be cryptographically signed. As alluded to above, supra note 36,
the Bitcoin blockchain requires transactions to be cryptographically signed, whereas in the
Ethereum protocol, computations and programs are also cryptographically signed. Other varia-
tions abound.
42 Peter Van Valkenburgh, What is "Blockchain" Anyway?, CoIN CrR. (Apr. 25, 2017),
www.coincenter.org/entry/what-is-blockchain-anyway; see also Richard Gendal Brown, Intro-
ducing R3 Cordam: A Distributed Ledger Designed for Financial Services, RICHARD GENDAL
BROWN (Apr. 5, 2016), https://gendal.me/2016/04/05/introducing-r3-corda-a-distributed-ledger-
designed-for-financial-services/ [https://perma.cc/7F75-U9PP] (defining DLT networks as "plat-
forms, shared across the Internet between mutually distrusting actors, that allow them to reach
consensus about the existence and evolution of facts shared between them").
43 Werbach & Cornell, supra note 34, at 333.
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A. A Brief Introduction to Smart Contracts
The term "smart contract" refers to decentralized computer
code" that runs on a DLT protocol 45 and manifests some combination
of the following characteristics: exerts some control over assets digi-
tally recorded on a DLT protocol,46 takes some action upon receipt of
specified data,47 is often, but not always, part of a DLT-based applica-
tion,48 guarantees execution,4 9 and writes the resulting state change
44 See DIEDRICH, supra note 33, at 167; see also MOUGAYAR, supra note 27, at 42-43
("Smart contracts are software code representing business logic that runs a blockchain .... ).
Others refer to smart contracts as "computer programs." See, e.g., TAPSCOTT & TAPsCoTr, supra
note 29, at 101. I prefer computer code, as it is the building block of a computer program, and as
smart contracts themselves can be used as building blocks for decentralized computer programs.
See MOUGAYAR, supra note 27, at 43 ("Smart contracts are usually part of a decentralized
(blockchain) application. There could be several contracts to a specific application."). "Com-
puter code," or simply "code," "is a mode of communication between computer programs, which
is often described as consisting of methods, data structures, and algorithms, that allow various
parties to exchange information concisely and efficiently." Christopher K. Odinet, Bitproperty
and Commercial Credit, 94 WASH. U. L. REv. 649, 659 (2017). For further reading on computer
code and other computer science terms, see generally CHARLEs PETZOLD, CODE (2000) and
NELL DALE & JOHN LEWIS, COMPUTER SCIENCE ILLUMINATED (5th ed. 2012).
45 DIEDRICH, supra note 33, at 174 ("Smart contracts live on the blockchain. They inherit
the limitation of decentralized code: Smart contracts cannot reach information outside the
blockchain."); Gideon Greenspan, Why Many Smart Contract Use Cases Are Simply Impossible,
CoNDESK (updated Apr. 18, 2016), http://www.coindesk.com/three-smart-contract-misconcep
tions/ [https://perma.cc/5572-T5F9] ("A smart contract is a piece of code that is stored on a[]
blockchain .... ); see also MOUGAYAR, supra note 27, at 43 ("Even in the Ethereum implemen-
tation, smart contracts run as quasi-Turing complete programs."); McGinnis & Roche, supra
note 27, at 39 ("The contract then lives on the Bitcoin blockchain, and will execute when an
event happens or the terms of the contract expire.").
46 See DIEDRICH, supra note 33, at 167 ("A smart contract is decentralized code that
moves money based on a condition. Any decentralized code can move money, i.e., cryptocur-
rency, or effect some other type of exchange, e.g. of digital assets."); MOUGAYAR, supra note 27,
at 42 (explaining that smart contracts "control a real-world valuable property via 'digital
means"').
47 See DIEDRICH, supra note 33, at 167 ("Smart contracts are decentralized code that [exe-
cutes] after a condition is fulfilled." (emphasis omitted)); MOUGAYAR, supra note 27, at 42-43
("Smart contracts are software code representing business logic that runs a blockchain, and they
are triggered by some external data that lets them modify some other data. They are closer to an
event-driven construct, more than artificial intelligence.").
48 See William Mougayar, 9 Myths Surrounding Blockchain Smart Contracts, CoiNDESK
(updated Apr. 18, 2016), http://www.coindesk.com/smart-contract-myths-blockchain/ [https://per
ma.cclUP3W-7ZDY] ("Smart contracts are usually part of a decentralized (blockchain) applica-
tion. There could be several contracts to a specific application. For example, if certain conditions
in a smart contract are met, then the program is allowed to update a database.").
49 DIEDRICH, supra note 33, at 168 ("A smart contract is guaranteed to execute.... Once
things are set in motion, the blockchain underneath serves as an independent third party and
makes sure that what was agreed upon in the code will be executed."); see also TAPscorr &
TAPsCoTr, supra note 29, at 101 ("For the purposes of this discussion, smart contracts are com-
puter programs that secure, enforce, and execute settlement of recorded agreements between
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from the operation of the smart contract into the DLT's ledger.50 The
data that triggers execution of the smart contract can be internal to
the DLT protocol 51 or the smart contract can receive the data from an
outside source.52 This concept of smart contracts originated with Nick
Szabo in 1994.53 Szabo initially defined smart contracts as "a set of
promises, specified in digital form, including protocols within which
people and organizations."); Werbach & Cornell, supra note 34, at 333 ("With smart contracts,
the transaction is irreversibly encoded on a distributed blockchain.").
50 Greenspan, supra note 45 ("A smart contract is a piece of code that is stored on a[]
blockchain, triggered by blockchain transactions and which reads and writes data in that
blockchain's database. . . . A smart contract is just a fancy name for code that runs on a
blockchain, and interacts with that blockchain's state."). Vitalik Buterin defines smart contracts
as "systems which automatically move digital assets according to arbitrary pre-specified rules."
VITALIK BUTERIN, ETHEREUM, ETHEREUM WHrTE PAPER: A NEXT GENERATION SMART CON-
TRACT & DECENTRALIZED APPLICATION PLATFORM 1 (2013). Others define smart contract as "a
computerized transaction protocol to execute contract terms." Alex Norta, Creation of Cross-
Organizational Collaborations for Decentralized Autonomous Organizations, 14 PERSP. Bus. IN-
PORMATICS RES. 3, 3 (2015), https://www.researchgate.net/publication/277014751_Creation of_
Cross-Organizational Collaborations forDecentralizedAutonomousOrganizations [https://
perma.cc/7Z8Q-7ERG]; Richard Gendal Brown, A Simple Model for Smart Contracts, RICHARD
GENDAL BROWN (Feb. 10, 2015), https://gendal.me/2015/02/10/a-simple-model-for-smart-con
tracts/ [https://perma.cc/9ZEP-4K9W] ("A smart contract is an event-driven program, with state,
which runs on a replicated, shared ledger and which can take custody over assets on that
ledger."). This longer definition is intended to reflect, for the nontechnical, that a smart contract
is not just of a singular shape and size but, rather, is a general-purpose technology that can be
put to many uses, and, as a result, some smart contracts will emphasize certain characteristics
over others.
51 DIEDRICH, supra note 33, at 167-68 (explaining that smart contracts move assets after a
condition has been filled and that "[t]he condition can be internal to the blockchain or fed in
from the outside").
52 Id. at 170 (explaining that relying on external data "is the usual situation for smart
contracts, they will be tied to external events and they are set in motion by receiving a signed
transaction expressing what the outcome of a specific event was" (emphasis omitted)). When
smart contracts receive data from outside sources, those outside sources are often referred to as
"oracles." MOUGAYAR, supra note 27, at 43 ("Oracles are data sources that send actionable
information to smart contracts."); Werbach & Cornell, supra note 34, at 336 ("Sometimes a
smart contract refers to facts in the world, for example, when a contract pays out if a stock
exceeds a certain price on a certain date. The Bitcoin blockchain knows nothing about stock
prices; it must collect that information through an external data feed. In the language of smart
contracts, systems that interpret such external feeds and verify contractual performance are
called 'oracles."'); Houman Shadab, What are Smart Contracts, and What Can We Do with
Them?, COIN CTR. (Dec. 15, 2014), https://coincenter.org/entry/what-are-smart-contracts-and-
what-can-we-do-with-them [https://perma.cc/H5DK-LTJQ].
53 S. ASHARAF & S. ADARSH, DECENTRALIZED COMPUTING USING BLOCKCHAIN TECH-
NOLOGIES AND SMART CONTRAS 45 (2017) ("The concept of smart contracts was first formally
coined by Nick Szabo in 1994."); MOUGAYAR, supra note 27, at 41 ("The concept was first intro-
duced by Nick Szabo in 1994 . . . ."); TAPSCOTr & TAPSCoTr, supra note 29, at 101 ("Szabo
coined the phrase in 1994, the same year that Netscape, the first web browser hit the
market . . . .").
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the parties perform on these promises."54 For Szabo, the purposes
guiding smart-contract design "are to satisfy common contractual con-
ditions (such as payment terms, liens, confidentiality, and even en-
forcement), minimize exceptions both malicious and accidental, and
minimize the need for trusted intermediaries."s5 The technology to
support Szabo's idea did not exist in 1994.56 When the Bitcoin
blockchain emerged in 2009, so did a platform for implementing smart
contracts.57 In fact, bitcoin transactions on the Bitcoin blockchain con-
stitute a very simple form of smart contract.58
Clearly, then, although lawyers and other professionals fre-
quently try to co-opt the term to always refer to some type of com-
puter-coded legal contract,59 the term smart contract, in fact, refers to
54 NICK SzABO, SMART CONTRACTS: BUILDING BLOCKS FOR DIGITAL MARKETS (1996),
http://www.fon.hum.uva.nl/rob/Courses/InformationInSpeech/CDROM/Literature/LOTwinter
school2006/szabo.best.vwh.net/smartcontracts2.html [https://perma.ccl5YPK-2765]; see also
Nick Szabo, Formalizing and Securing Relationships on the Public Networks, FIRST MONDAY
(Sept. 1, 1997), http://firstmonday.org/ojs/index.php/fm/article/view/548/469 [https://perma.cc/
GRK3-LG2M].
55 NICK SZABO, SMART CONTRACTS (1994), http://www.fon.hum.uva.nl/rob/Courses/Infor
mationInSpeechlCDROMfLiterature/LOTwinterschool2006/szabo.best.vwh.net/smart.contracts
.html [https://perma.ccl9DJ4-MVW6].
56 See J. DAX HANSEN & CARLA L. REYES, PERKINSCOIE, LEGAL ASPECTS OF SMART
CoNrRAcr APPLICATIONS 1 (May 2017), https://www.jdsupra.com/post/fileServer.aspx?fName=
748e06b9-ddOl-4c61-8e55-3bdcb3b8e8b6.pdf [https://perma.cc/8E5G-YWU7] (citing Mougayar,
supra note 48); see also TAPsCOrr & TAPSCOTr, supra note 29, at 102 ("Back then, smart con-
tracts were an idea all dressed up with nowhere to go, as no available technology could deploy
them as Szabo described.").
57 MOUGAYAR, supra note 27, at 41 ("The concept was first introduced by Nick Szabo in
1994, but it underwent a long gestation period of inactivity and disinterest, because there was no
platform that could enforce smart contracts, until the advent of the Bitcoin blockchain technol-
ogy in 2009.").
58 DIEDRICH, supra note 33, at 115 ("Every cryptocurrency transfer is but a simple smart
contract. The mechanism is one and the same, it's just a smart contract's simplest form: one
signature and the money moves."); Merit K61vart, Margus Poola & Addi Rull, Smart Contracts,
in THE FUTURE OF LAW AND ETECHNOLOGIEs 133, 145 (Tanel Kerikmae & Addi Rull eds., 2016)
("Smart contracts are automated computer agents that fulfil certain tasks, for instance, transfer-
ring digital property.").
59 This category includes the Barclays idea of "Smart Contract Templates" as human-read-
able legal-prose contracts that can be enforced normally in court, but just kept and tracked on a
DLT protocol.
The aim of Smart Contract Templates is to support the management of the
complete lifecycle of "smart" legal contracts. This includes the creation of legal
document templates by standards bodies and the subsequent use of those templates
in the negotiation and agreement of contracts by counterparties. They also facilitate
automated performance of the contract and, in the event of dispute, provide a di-
rect link to the relevant legal documentation.
Christopher D. Clack, Vikram A. Bakshi & Lee Braine, Smart Contract Templates: Foundations,
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a much broader set of software programs.60 Although the first applica-
tions of smart contracts involve cryptocurrency transfers, smart con-
tracts can "apply to almost anything that changes its state over time,
and could have a value attached to it."61 Ultimately, smart contract
uses are limited only by the imagination and skills of those that write
the software code.62
To enable those with the vision for more complex smart-contract
applications to implement them, the creators of Ethereum designed
the protocol to enable more complex smart contracts than the Bitcoin
blockchain.63 The Ethereum protocol supports its own coding lan-
guage, Solidity, intended to enable software developers to write com-
plex smart contracts more simply.64 Furthermore, Ethereum contracts
are stateful and Turing-complete-they have "memory that they will
remember the next time they are called and . . . they can have
loops." 65 Smart contracts running on the Ethereum protocol are
stored in the blocks of the Ethereum blockchain, not off-chain.
6
6
These features often make the Ethereum protocol more attractive to
those interested in creating programs with smart-contract elements.
Design Landscape and Research Directions, BARCLAYS BANK PLC 1 (rev. Mar. 15,2017), https://
arxiv.org/pdf/1608.00771v2.pdf [https://perma.cc/B5LX-SK72].
60 See Mougayar, supra note 48 (explaining that smart contracts are not the same as a
contractual agreement, but rather, "[i]f we stick to Nick Szabo's original idea, smart contracts
help make the breach of an agreement expensive because they control a real-world valuable
property via 'digital means"'); see also DIEDRICH, supra note 33, at 169 ("A smart contract is not
necessarily between two parties, and in reality almost never, so far, the mirror image or replace-
ment of a legal contract."); MOUGAYAR, supra note 27, at 42 ("Smart contracts are not the same
as a contractual agreement.").
61 MOUGAYAR, supra 27, at 43.
62 For a review of some of the current use cases being built, see HANSEN & REYES, supra
note 56, at 5-13.
63 See Josh Stark, Making Sense of Blockchain Smart Contracts, Com4DESK (updated June
7, 2016), http://www.coindesk.com/making-sense-smart-contracts/ [https://perma.cc/4LWJ-
H3DU] ("To developers and others working directly with blockchain technology, the term
'smart contracts' is most often used to refer to this blockchain code. . . . The term has been
particularly associated with the Ethereum project, whose primary purpose is to be a platform for
smart contract code."); see also MOUGAYAR, supra note 27, at 41 ("Since 2015, smart contracts
have been gaining popularity, especially since Ethereum made programming them a basic tenet
of their blockchain's power.").
64 MOUGAYAR, supra note 27, at 43 (noting Ethereum's Solidity is a specific smart-con-
tract language that "lets you write complex processes in a few lines of code").
65 DIEDRICH, supra note 33, at 28; id at 28 n.29 ("All modern programming languages are
Turing-complete, from which follows that what can be programmed in one language can be
programmed in any other. It just looks and performs differently. The Bitcoin blockchain as a
whole is Turing-complete, too, but its individual scripts that drive its transactions, are not, as they
do not allow for loops.").
66 Id. at 37.
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For these reasons, the creators of the first (and most famous) DAO
elected to use the Ethereum protocol as the underlying DLT.
B. Smart Contracts Enable DAOs 67
A DAO is computer software, distributed across a peer-to-peer
network, that "incorporat[es] governance and decision-making
rules."68 Essentially, DAOs are elaborate smart contracts or systems of
smart contracts.69 At a very general level, the smart contracts that
comprise a DAO allow a certain set of DAO members to spend the
digital assets held by those smart contracts or to modify the DAO's
code.7 0 To understand DAOs in a less abstract way, consider a DAO
deployed on the Ethereum protocol. In order to operate, the DAO's
code needs ether, the cryptocurrency that powers activity on Ether-
eum.71 A DAO might obtain the ether it needs to operate by selling
tokens.7 2 Those tokens give the purchaser certain rights in the DAO.7 3
The DAO, on its own, can store the ether it earned through the token
sales and can use the ether in accordance with the parameters set out
in its code.7 4 For other activity, like building a product, the DAO
needs what the industry refers to as a "Contractor."7 5 Potential Con-
tractors submit proposals to the DAO, and those proposals are voted
on by tokenholders with the right to vote.7 6 In at least one DAO,
67 I am aware of a debate about whether a distinction must be made between
Decentralized Organizations ("DOs") and DAOs. See Vitalik Buterin, DAOs, DACs, DAs and
More: An Incomplete Terminology Guide, ETHEREUM BLOG (May 6, 2014), https://blog.ethere
um.org/2014/05/06/daos-dacs-das-and-more-an-incomplete-terminology-guide/ [https://perma.cc/
LU54-3F76]. In this debate, a DO is "a set of humans interacting with each other according to a
protocol specified in code, and enforced on the blockchain." Id. Meanwhile, a DAO is said to be
"something that, in some fashion, makes decisions for itself." Id. Because much of that debate is
technical in nature (some of it relating to the prevalence and importance of collusion attacks, for
example), I do not engage that debate here. Rather, this Article uses the term DAO to refer to
both possibilities, which is in keeping with general media commentary and common parlance in
the industry. See ALLEN & OVERY LLP, DECENTRALIZED AUTONoMous ORGANIZATIONS 2 &
n.1 (2016), http://www.allenovery.com/SiteCollectionDocuments/Article%20Decentralized%20
Autonomous%200rganizations.pdf [https://perma.cclRFN8-YUYQ].
68 ALLEN & OVERY LLP, supra note 67, at 2.
69 DIEDRICH, supra note 33, at 31.
70 See BUTERIN, supra note 50, at 1.
71 CHRISTOPH JENTZSCH, SLOCK.rr, DECENTRALIZED AUTONOMOUS ORGANIZATION TO
AUTOMATE GOVERNANCE 1-2 (2016), https://download.slock.it/public/DAO/WbitePaper.pdf
[https://perma.cc/338L-74SJ].
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tokenholders have votes weighted by the amount of tokens that they
control.77 If the proposal is approved by the required percentage of
tokenholders, the DAO transfers the ether required for the project "to
a smart contract representing the proposed project."78 Tokenholders
can sell their tokens and transfer the tokens and related rights to
others.79 If a DAO generates new ether through the sale of products,
tokenholders are entitled to rewards proportional to the
tokenholders' original contribution."
Lest this all sound like science fiction, a brief review81 of the life
and swift death of a very prominent real-world DAO is warranted.
Deployed on the Ethereum protocol, this DAO, referred to as "The
DAO," sought to democratize venture capital.82 The DAO issued to-
kens to investors in exchange for ether, with the intent of investing
that ether into other cryptocurrency startup ventures, with investment
decisions made by a vote of the tokenholders.83 Initial investors pur-
chased $168 million worth of tokens from The DAO.84 Before The
DAO ever made its first investment, on June 17, 2016, a tokenholder
siphoned off $55 million worth of ether from The DAO by exploiting
flaws in its code.85 A debate erupted in the Ethereum community re-
garding whether the tokenholder's actions were valid, testing the fre-
quently touted mantra that "the code is law."8 6 The details of that
debate and the resulting Ethereum "hard fork"8 7 are beyond the scope
of this Article. For our purposes, the broader point is that DAOs al-
ready exist. Further, the rise and spectacular failure of The DAO high-




80 See id. at 3, 10.
81 For a very detailed review of The DAO's history, see Reyes, Packin & Edwards, supra
note 36, at 4-7; see also Mark Fenwick, Wulf A. Kaal & Erik P.M. Vermeulen, Legal Education
in the Blockchain Revolution 376-78 (Univ. Saint Thomas (Minn.) Legal Studies, Research Pa-
per No. 17-05, 2017), https://ssrn.com/abstract=2939127 [https://perma.cc/DD4E-YMDM].
82 See Nathaniel Popper, A Venture Fund With Plenty of Virtual Capital, But No Capitalist,
N.Y. TiMEs: DEALBOOK (May 21, 2016), https://www.nytimes.com/2016/05/22/business/deal
book/crypto-ether-bitcoin-currency.html?_r=0 [https://perma.cc/RA4K-7LGP?type=image].
83 See id. Again, as to terminology, note that The DAO was named DAO and not DO even
though it required a vote of tokenholders (humans) to select investments.
84 Reyes, Packin & Edwards, supra note 36, at 4.
85 Id. at 6 (citing Steven Norton, Downfall of DAO Digital Currency Fund Shows
Blockchain Reputational Risk, WALL ST. J.: CIO J. (June 20, 2016, 6:35 PM), http://blogs.wsj
.com/cio/2016/06/20/downfall-of-dao-digital-currency-fund-shows-blockchain-reputational-risk/
[https://perma.cc/Q7X6-V26L]).
86 Id. at 7.
87 See id.
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organization law. The question "Who is liable for the hack?" quickly
led to broader questions of whether DAOs should generally be con-
sidered partnerships with unlimited joint and several personal liability
for partners or some form of recognized business entity with limited
liability and separate legal personhood.8
II. DECENTRALIZED BUSINESs ENTITIES NEED A
DIFFERENT ENTrry FORM
Professor Dwight Drake refers to business organizations as le-
gally "immortal" beings, focusing on the fact that as a result of the
operation of state law, corporations are viewed as a separate being,
can have offspring, feature a perpetual existence, and can assemble
capital.89 Surprisingly, technologists describe DAOs in similar lan-
guage, defining them as "self-sustaining, economic entities that 'live'
on the chain and offer real-world services . . .which [are] programmed
to perpetuate its existence."90 DAOs can be programmed to "marshal
resources-that is, raising funds by providing services or issuing eq-
uity, and spending them on needed resources, such as processing
power or storage."9 1
As a result, several theories regarding the legal nature of DAOs
as business organizations emerged. Some writers maintained that
DAOs constitute general partnerships.92 Professor Shawn Bayern pro-
posed,93 and Professor Lynn M. LoPucki further explored,9 4 the idea
88 See, e.g., Ronald D. Smith & David E. Barrett, The DAO's Wild Ride: Where Does
Blockchain Go From Here?, FORBES (July 1, 2016), https://www.forbes.com/sites/realspin/2016/
07/01/the-daos-wild-ride-where-does-blockchain-go-from-here/#4fle637e3e5c [https://perma.cc/
8B2S-BYFT] ("Needless to say, participants are scrambling to understand their legal rights.
Among the most important issues to determine are what The DAO is legally, what it could be
under current law, and whether changes are needed to existing law to accommodate the concept.
From available information, it does not appear that The DAO created any formal legal entity. If
this is the case, American courts may treat The DAO as a general partnership as stakeholders
share profits, own The DAO jointly, and manage the business of The DAO. This could lead to
many unwanted consequences, including the potential for individual liability for the acts of other
stakeholders and obligations of The DAO.").
89 DWIGirr DRAKE, BusINEss ORGANIZATIONS IN A PLANNING CONTEXT 136-37 (2013).
90 DIEDRICH, supra note 33, at 31.
91 MELANIE SWAN, BLOCKCHAIN 16 (2015).
92 See, e.g., Stephen D. Palley, How to Sue a Decentralized Autonomous Organization,
CoiNDESK (updated Mar. 21, 2016), http://www.coindesk.comlhow-to-sue-a-decentralized-auto
nomous-organization/ [https://perma.cc/XNT6-XGC4].
93 See Bayern, supra note 25; Bayern, supra note 29, at 263-64; see also Shawn Bayern et
al., Company Law and Autonomous Systems: A Blueprint for Lawyers, Entrepreneurs, and Regu-
lators, 9 HASTINGS Sa. & TECH. L. 135, 136 (2017).
94 Lynn M. LoPucki, Algorithmic Entities, 95 WASH. U. L. REv. 887 (2018). Professor
LoPucki also explores how algorithmic entities, potentially including fully autonomous DLT-
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that autonomous computer software, including those operating on
DLT, can operate an LLC created for it by a human incorporator.
Others declared that the legal question of the corporate form of
DAOs represents a new and unpredictable frontier.95 Still others indi-
cated that the legal characterization of a DAO will ultimately rest on
facts and circumstances.9 6 This Article argues that DAOs should strive
to avoid automatic treatment as a general partnership, that an alterna-
tive treatment need not rest on something new and unpredictable, and
that DAOs need not rely on a human incorporator to confer legal per-
sonhood upon them. Rather, this Article makes the novel argument
that certain DAOs, and certain decentralized or distributed business
entities ("DBEs") at other levels of the technology, fit the definition
of an exceedingly old alternative to the registered corporation-the
common-law (or "Massachusetts") business trust.
This Part first uncovers the mismatch between partnership law
and DBEs. Specifically, this Part argues that partnership treatment of
such business ventures results in undesirable results, both for partici-
pants in the DLT system and society at large. Concluding that strong
policy reasons exist for providing limited liability and separate legal
personhood to certain DBEs, this Part next reveals the practical and
theoretical mismatch between the corporate and LLC forms and
DBEs. Finally, this Part describes a possible alternative form for
DBEs: the common-law business trust. Importantly, this Article is the
first to theorize about DBEs at three separate levels of DLT-the pro-
tocol, smart contract, and DAO levels. This approach, rooted in sys-
tems analysis,97 allows the law to embrace the complexity of DLT and,
inversely, enables deeper understanding of how business trusts may
impact governance models for public, open-source DLT protocols.
based entities, might layer a corporate or partnership form on top of Professor Bayern's LLC
"dyad" idea. Id.
95 See Seth Bannon, The Tao of "The DAO" or: How the Autonomous Corporation Is
Already Here, TECHCRUNCH (May 16, 2016), https://techcrunch.com/2016/05/16/the-tao-of-the-
dao-or-how-the-autonomous-corporation-is-already-here/ [https://perma.cc/NA4Q-KBLL].
96 JENTZSCH, supra note 71, at 1 ("Ultimately, how a DAO functions and its legal status
will depend on many factors, including how DAO code is used, where it is used, and who uses
it.").
97 For an introduction to systems analysis and its potential use in legal study, see Tamara
Belinfanti & Lynn Stout, Contested Visions: The Value of Systems Theory for Corporate Law,
166 U. PA. L. REV. 578, 580 (2018); Lynn M. LoPucki, The Systems Approach to Law, 82 COR-
NELL L. REV. 479 (1997).
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A. Partnership Treatment Results in Undesirable Results
The oldest business entity with multiple owners,98 the partner-
ship,99 exists when there is an "association of two or more persons to
carry on as co-owners of a business for profit . . . , whether or not the
persons intend to form a partnership."00 As a default entity, when a
business venture with multiple owners fails to file paperwork to oper-
ate the business in some other form (such as an LLC or corporation),
a partnership is automatically formed.01 Each owner of the business
(each partner) faces personal joint and several liability with every
other owner for the liabilities of the partnership.0 2 Further, each part-
ner possesses the authority, as an agent of the partnership, to act on
behalf of the partnership in the ordinary course of business, subject to
certain exceptions.10 3 Because DBEs frequently do not file formal
documents electing another business entity, many may constitute part-
nerships. As further described below, such treatment at the protocol,
smart contract and DAO levels lead to unexpected, and often undesir-
able, results for both entrepreneurs individually and society generally.
1. DLT Protocols as Partnerships
Without considering business entity law, Vitalik Buterin, founder
of the Ethereum protocol, described the Bitcoin blockchain as a
corporation:
Bitcoin has 21 million shares, and these shares are owned by
what can be considered Bitcoin's shareholders. It has em-
ployees, and it has a protocol for paying them: 25 BTC to
one random member of the workforce roughly every ten
minutes. It even has its own marketing department, to a
large extent made up of the shareholders themselves.104
98 DRAKE, supra note 89, at 42.
99 A partnership is "also called a general partnership to distinguish it from a limited part-
nership." WILLIAM K. SJOSTROM, JR., BusINEss ORGANIZATIONS 5 (2d ed. 2016).
100 REVISED UNIF. P'sHp Acr (RUPA) § 202(a) (UmeF. LAW COMM'N 2013).
101 See SJOSTROM, supra note 99, at 5.
102 See RUPA § 306(a); DRAKE, supra note 89, at 45; SOSTRoM, supra note 99, at 7-8
(noting that under the Uniform Partnership Act ("UPA"), joint and several liability exists for
torts, but not contracts, while joint and several liability exists for both torts and contracts under
RUPA).
103 See RUPA § 301.
104 Vitalik Buterin, Bootstrapping A Decentralized Autonomous Corporation: Part I,
BrrcoN MAG. (Sept. 19, 2013, 10:31 PM) https://bitcoinmagazine.com/articles/bootstrapping-a-
decentralized-autonomous-corporation-part-i-1379644274/ [https://perma.ccl0758-SUDQ].
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Daniel Larimer, founder and lead developer of the BitShares
blockchain,05 similarly described the Bitcoin blockchain as a Decen-
tralized Autonomous Corporation ("DAC"):
Think of a crypto-currency as shares in a [DAC] where
the source code defines the bylaws. The goal of the DAC is
to earn a profit for the shareholders by performing valuable
services for the free market. With this goal in mind set out to
maximize shareholder value at every stage as you design the
bylaws that govern operation of the DAC.106
In reality, Satoshi Nakamoto1 0 did not register the Bitcoin blockchain
as a corporation under any state law. Without such incorporation, the
Bitcoin blockchain is not a corporation, regardless of the theoretical
comparisons made by Buterin and Larimer. That reality does not,
however, prevent a DLT protocol from being recognized as a general
partnership if the elements of the protocol are mapped against the
elements of partnership slightly differently.
A DLT protocol can be viewed as an asset managed by multiple
parties in the pursuit of a profit through the provision of services to
the public. Take the Bitcoin blockchain, for example. Conceptualizing
the Bitcoin blockchain as an asset of a business venture would render
those that profit from activities conducted on the protocol partners in
105 See Bebeto Nyamwamu, Who is Daniel Larimer? The EOS Shotgun, 101 BLOCKCHAINS
(June 21, 2018), https://lOlblockchains.com/who-is-daniel-larimer-eos-founder/ [https://perma.cc/
3F5B-8V26]. For more information on BitShares, see BrrsHAREs, https://bitshares.org/ [https://
perma.cc/N9J7-GCLE]. Notably, "[tihe developers of BitShares formed Cryptonomex," an in-
corporated entity, "to monetize the technology, experience, reputation and good will they accu-
mulated during their first two years of development and operations." Graphene Technical
Documentation, BrrSHAREs, http://docs.bitshares.eul [https://perma.cclQZ56-PSLW]. Crypto-
nomex is billed as "an independent blockchain development company founded by the core de-
velopers of the BitShares blockchain" with a mission "to facilitate the growth and adoption of
industrial blockchain technology." CRYPTONOMEx, https://cryptonomex.com/ [https://perma.cc/
X3ED-8Y5V]. Perhaps the founders of BitShares read reports that without the benefit of a regis-
tered corporation law they may face unlimited liability as participants in a general partnership.
106 Daniel Larimer, Overpaying for Security: The Hidden Costs of Bitcoin, LET'S TALK
BrrcoiN (Sept. 7, 2013), https://letstalkbitcoin.com/is-bitcoin-overpaying-for-false-security#.Ujt
iUt9xy0w [https://perma.cc/DGY9-2LCH].
107 Satoshi Nakamoto is the mythic-like creator of bitcoin and the Bitcoin blockchain.
Speculation abounds as to whether Satoshi Nakamoto is a single person or a group of several
people. Several claim to have discovered Satoshi Nakamoto's identity, but proof of such claims
remains elusive. See, e.g., Leah McGrath Goodman, The Face Behind Bitcoin, NEWSWEEK (Mar.
6, 2014, 6:05 AM), http://www.newsweek.com/2014/03/14/face-behind-bitcoin-247957.html
[https://perma.cc/L48X-TP4A]; Michael Safi, Australian Craig Wright Claims He Is Bitcoin
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the business venture. Those that profit from activities conducted on
the Bitcoin blockchain include both miners'0 and bitcoin holders.109
This profit is generated by other entrepreneurial activities conducted
on the blockchain.110 The more companies build bitcoin and
blockchain-based businesses, the higher the value of bitcoin soars."1 '
So, if the Bitcoin blockchain is managed well, entrepreneurs will turn
to it for their businesses, and the value of bitcoin will increase, along
with the number of transactions upon which fees can be earned. Thus,
the management of the Bitcoin blockchain by miners and the invest-
ment in bitcoin by bitcoin holders can be viewed as an association of
multiple parties to carry on activity in the pursuit of a profit. Never-
theless, viewing those working with the Bitcoin blockchain as a part-
nership strains policy sentiment in several ways.
First, while bitcoin miners make an affirmative choice to under-
take economic activity in pursuit of profit, arguably at least some of
the bitcoin holders do not. Although some invest in bitcoin holdings
as a form of currency speculation11 2 others purchase and hold bitcoin
for use as a medium of exchange,1 13 just as residents of the United
States regularly use the dollar as a medium of exchange. Just as unsus-
pecting consumers of the U.S. Dollar would not expect to be partners
in the minting and management of currency, neither do the consumers
of bitcoin, intentional investors or otherwise, expect to be partners in
the business of managing the Bitcoin blockchain. Notably, partnership
law does not care whether the participants in the venture expect to
form a partnership or not.1 14 In other words, partnerships may "be
108 See ANTONOPOULOS, supra note 30, at 214 ("Miners receive two types of rewards in
return for the security provided by mining: new coins created with each new block, and transac-
tion fees from all the transactions included in the block.").
109 See id. at 1 ("Bitcoin can be purchased, sold, and exchanged for other currencies at
specialized currency exchanges.").
110 See, e.g., Kashmir Hill, The People Making Real Money on Bitcoin, FoRBES (July 8,
2013, 9:00 PM), https://www.forbes.com/sites/kashmirhill/2013/07/08/the-people-making-real-
money-on-bitcoin/#559e42a33e39 [https://perma.cclSRN8-99HH].
111 See Joseph Young, Bitcoin Price Will Reach $10,000, Might Take Another Year: Tim
Draper, CoiNTELEGRAPH (Jan. 31, 2017), https://cointelegraph.comlnews/bitcoin-price-will-
reach-10000-might-take-another-year-tim-draper [https://perma.cc/5JW3-Z9CV].
112 See Young, supra note 111 ("For currency traders that hold Bitcoin as a direct invest-
ment, they will benefit from the short-term increase in Bitcoin value. . . . Some currency traders
are also holding Bitcoin as digital gold and see[] it as a safe haven asset rather than a settlement
system.").
113 See ANTONOPOULOS, supra note 30, at 1 ("Users can transfer bitcoin over the network
to do just about anything that can be done with conventional currencies, including buy and sell
goods, send money to people or organizations, or extend credit.").
114 See SlosTRoM, supra note 99, at 130 ("No formalities are required to form a partner-
ship. A partnership is formed when (1) two or more people associate to carry on as co-owners a
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formed 'accidentally' by parties" that effectively "act as co-owners of
a business."s1 5 Under the doctrine of inadvertent partnership, each of
these actors could be considered a partner, subject to joint and several
personal liability for the actions of the partnership.116 Treatment of
DLT protocols as partnerships would thus run contrary to the express
interest of many regulators in protecting consumer bitcoin holders
from unexpected effects of transacting with bitcoin and other DLT
protocols.117 Bitcoin users, viewing themselves as consumers, should
not assume joint and several liability for the obligations of the Bitcoin
blockchain"8t accidentally under the law of partnership."9 Partner-
ships offer a poor business entity form for DBEs at the protocol level.
Second, the law of partnership may view the mysterious creator
of the Bitcoin blockchain, Satoshi Nakamoto, as a partner in the en-
terprise as well. Nakamoto created the protocol, released it to the
world under an open-source license,120 and retained significant bitcoin
holdings from mining early blocks of the protocol.121 Nakamoto's ac-
business for profit, and (2) they do not file the paperwork (e.g., articles of incorporation or
organization) to operate the business in some other form. If these elements are met, the people
involved have created a partnership even if they had no idea they were doing so. This situation is
called an inadvertent partnership." (footnote omitted)).
115 Shawn Bayern, Three Problems (and Two Solutions) in the Law of Partnership Forma-
tion, 49 MIcH. J.L. REFORM 605, 608 (2016).
116 See id. at 607 ("Participants in business activities face unlimited contractual and tort
liability for the debts of the business unless the business chooses, in advance, to opt out of such
liability." (citing UNIF. P'sHIP Acr (UPA) § 306(a), (c) (UNme. LAW COMM'N 1997))).
117 See, e.g., Bitcoin Consumer Alert, WASH. ST. DEP'T FIN. INsTITuTIONs (rev. May 15,
2014), https://dfi.wa.gov/consumer/alerts/bitcoin-consumer-alert [h tps://perma.cc/ER4M-LQ79]
(providing bitcoin related advice to consumers); Bitcoin: More Than a Bit Risky, FIN. INDuSTRY
REG. AuTHoRIT (May 7, 2014), http://www.finra.org/investors/alerts/bitcoin-more-bit-risky
[https://perma.cc/7AQ4-ZNC2] (warning consumers of risk of bitcoin investment); Guidance:
Application of FinCEN's Regulations to Persons Administering, Exchanging, or Using Virtual
Currencies, FIN. CRIMEs ENFORCEMENT NETWORK (Mar. 18, 2013), https://www.fincen.gov/sites/
default/fles/shared/FFN-2013-GOO1.pdf [https://perma.ccl35C5-4Z4L] (excluding users from
regulation).
118 Losses resulting from a hard fork in the protocol represent an example of a liability that
might arise in the management of the asset (the protocol). See William Suberg, Bitcoin Will
Likely Lose Value with Hard or Soft Fork: Wealth Daily, COINTELEGRAPH (June 27, 2017),
https://cointelegraph.com/news/bitcoin-will-likely-lose-value-with-hard-or-soft-fork-wealth-daily
[https://perma.cc/4WYX-JNMC].
119 I have been using the Bitcoin blockchain as an example, but the rationale holds true for
other DLT protocols as well. Many of their users will view themselves as mere consumers, not as
partners, and would certainly have no expectation of joint and several liability.
120 SATosHI NAKAMOTO, BITCOIN-A PEER-TO-PEER ELECTRONIC CASH SYSTEM (2008),
reprinted in ANTONOPOULOS, supra note 30, at 305.
121 Who Is Satoshi Nakamoto?, CoiNDESK (Feb. 19, 2016), https://www.coindesk.com/infor
mation/who-is-satoshi-nakamoto/ [https://perma.cc/3SAA-NABF] (stating that "Satoshi mined
many of the early blocks in the bitcoin network, and that he had built up a fortune of around 1
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tivity, therefore, could be characterized as contributing to a joint en-
terprise in pursuit of a profit, and Nakamoto arguably fits the bill of a
partner under the inadvertent partnership doctrine. This reveals a sec-
ond undesirable result from treating DBEs as partnerships at the pro-
tocol level. Imposing personal liability upon the creator of a public,
open-source protocol runs contrary to the common understanding and
ethos of the open-source-software community.122 In fact, the choice to
conduct economic activity on an open-source basis can be understood
as an explicit economic choice: "[W]hen the cost of organizing an ac-
tivity on a peered basis is lower than the cost of using the market or
hierarchical organization, then peer production will emerge."'2 As a
result, treating the developer of an open-source protocol as a partner
would run directly contrary to the economic choice made at the time
of the protocol's creation. Such a result makes little legal or economic
sense and would likely stifle innovation in important emerging tech-
nology.124 Theorizing about DLT protocols as business entities thus
reveals the need for a business entity option that carries limited liabil-
ity and separate personhood. Limited liability and separate per-
sonhood would protect unsuspecting users and open-source software
creators from unexpected unlimited personal liability and would ar-
guably further encourage innovation through peer production when
doing so is the economically rational choice.
million unspent bitcoins" (citing Sergio Lerner, The Well Deserved Fortune of Satoshi
Nakamoto, Bitcoin Creator, Visionary, and Genius, BrrsLoG (Apr. 17, 2013), https:/ibitslog.word
press.com/2013/04/17/the-well-deserved-fortune-of-satoshi-nakamoto/ [https://perma.cc/32RX-
EC4S])).
122 See, e.g., Karim R. Lakhani & Robert G. Wolf, Why Hackers Do What They Do: Under-
standing Motivation and Effort in Free/Open Source Software Projects, in PERSPECTIVES ON FREE
AND OPEN SOURCE So-rWARE 3, 3, 4-7 (J. Feller, B. Fitzgerald, S. Hissam & K. Lakhani eds.,
2005) (finding that "enjoyment-based intrinsic motivation[,] ... user need, intellectual stimula-
tion derived from writing code, and improving programming skills" are the top reasons for con-
tributing to open-source software projects).
123 Yochai Benkler, Coase's Penguin, or, Linux and the Nature of the Firm, 112 YALE L.J.
369, 403 (2002).
124 See Siva Vaidhyanathan, Open Source as Culture-Culture as Open Source, OPEN
SOURCE JAHRBUCH 359, 361 (2005) (Ger.), http://www.opensourcejahrbuch.de/download/jb2005/
OpenSourceJahrbuch2005_online.pdf [https://perma.cclH8EX-VNZ8] ("In fact, as economist
Richard Adkisson argues, the veneration of forceful intellectual property rights as the founda-
tion of innovation and creativity above all other forms has promoted an unhealthy cultural and
social condition, [one] which can generate suboptimal levels of investment, asset allocation, and
policy choices." (citing Richard V. Adkisson, Ceremonialism, Intellectual Property Rights, and
Innovation Activity, 38 J. EcoN. ISSUEs 459 (2004))).
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2. Smart Contracts as Partnerships
Many smart contracts manage and control assets on behalf of
others.12 5 Such contracts are often created by two or more persons
who contribute the assets that the smart contract manages and con-
trols, and then the smart contract is left to run autonomously.126 Such
an arrangement might be viewed as an agreement between co-owners
to carry on a business for profit in which the smart contract manages
the assets. Under such circumstances, Professor Bayern thinks part-
nership law would recognize a partnership, despite its odd configura-
tion.127 Occasionally, however, a single person or a single legal entity
will create a smart contract to manage and control assets on behalf of
others. Under such circumstances, a partnership, which requires the
joint association of two or more persons in pursuit of a profit,'2 would
not be formed. Further, under such circumstances, partnership treat-
ment may not be appropriate as a policy matter.
Take, for example, the smart contract often referred to as Ether-
eum's "killer app," a smart contract for an "initial coin offering"
("ICO").129 A wave of very successful ICOs recently drew attention
from the media, regulators, and entrepreneurs alike. At the end of
May 2017, Brave Browser, a company intent on disrupting the in-
ternet-advertising industry,130 raised $36 million in roughly 30
seconds. ' 3  Distributed cloud-storage service provider Storj13 2 also
125 DIEDRICH, supra note 33, at 167 ("A smart contract is decentralized code that moves
money based on a condition. Any decentralized code can move money, i.e. cryptocurrency, or
effect some other type of exchange, e.g. of digital assets."); MOUGAYAR, supra note 27, at 42
(explaining that smart contracts "control a real-world valuable property via 'digital means"').
126 See Josh Stark, Making Sense of Blockchain Smart Contracts, CoINDESK (June 7, 2016),
https://www.coindesk.com/making-sense-smart-contracts/ [https://perma.cc/FWT7-56FU].
127 Bayern, supra note 25, at 101 (arguing that two legal persons can form a partnership and
RUPA offers great flexibility in shaping partnership agreements and noting that although there
remains some dispute over whether a partnership can operate without partners, "it is possible for
general partnerships under RUPA to encapsulate autonomous systems" (citing UPA §§ 103(a),
(b)(8), 202(a) (UNIF. LAW COMM'N 1997)). See generally Robert W. Hillman & Donald J. Weid-
ner, Partners Without Partners: The Legal Status of Single Person Partnerships, 17 FoRDHAM J.
CORP. & FIN. L. 449 (2012) (debating whether a partnership with a single member remains a
partnership).
128 RUPA § 102(11) (UNiF. LAW COMM'N 2013).
129 See, e.g., Brian Patrick Eha, Why this Venture Capitalist Wants to Make Traditional VC
Obsolete, AM. BANKER (Apr. 3, 2017, 2:32 PM), https://www.americanbanker.com/news/why-
this-venture-capitalist-wants-to-make-traditional-vc-obsolete [https://perma.cclX4CC-SCB8]
("Ethereum is still in many ways a prototype. But we have finally figured out what its first killer
application is: ICOs.").
130 See generally About, BRAvE BROWSER, https://www.brave.com/about/ [https://perma.cc/
2A5N-EPSH].
131 Jonathan Nieh, Brave Browser's ICO Raises $36 Million in 30 Seconds, CROWDFUND
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raised $30 million through an ICO in May 2017, attracting institutional
investors such as Iterative Instinct Management.133 1,072 ICOs raised
roughly $21.5 billion in 2018,134 which is a far larger number than the
453 ICOs that raised over $6.5 billion in 2017,135 and the 51 ICOs that
raised just under $100 million during 2016.136 ICOs often take place
through a smart contract. The smart contract sets the number of to-
kens available in the offering, sets the token price, and is made pub-
licly available for potential purchasers to see.'37 When a purchaser
buys tokens, he or she sends the purchase price in cryptocurrency to
the smart contract,138 which triggers the transmission of the corre-
sponding number of tokens.139
Consumer protection in ICOs emerged as a central policy consid-
eration in 2017.140 Many of the individuals investing in ICOs are con-
INSIDER (June 2, 2017, 7:08 AM), https://www.crowdfundinsider.com/2017/06/101301-brave-
browsers-ico-raises-36-million-30-seconds/ [https://perma.cc/L9A6-FR7H]; Jon Russell, Former
Mozilla CEO Raises $35M in Under 30 Seconds for His Browser Startup Brave, TECHCRUNCH
(June 1, 2017), https://techcrunch.com/2017/06/01/brave-ico-35-million-30-seconds-brendan-eich/
[https://perma.cc/8TKZ-XSXS].
132 STORJ, https://storj.io/ [https://perma.cc/M2F7-JLZB].
133 Ari Levy, There's a New Way for Casual Investors to Get in on the Cryptocurrency
Craze, CNBC (June 4, 2017), http://www.cnbc.com/2017/06/04/bitcoin-and-ethereum-rallies-
have-led-to-funds-like-for-storj-ico.html [https://perma.cc/32VJ-PGZM].
134 Cryptocurrency ICO Stats 2018, COINSCHEDULE, https://www.coinschedule.com/stats/
Jan+01%2C+2018+to+Dec+31%2C+2018 [https://perma.cc/Q885-SY65].
135 Cryptocurrency ICO Stats 2017, COINSCHEDULE, https://www.coinschedule.com/stats/
Jan+01%2C+2017+to+Dec+31%2C+2017 [https://perma.cc/SC4U-R6FT].
136 Cryptocurrency ICO Stats 2016, COmNSCHEDULE, https://www.coinschedule.com/stats/
Jan+01%2C+2016+to+Dec+31%2C+2016 [https://perma.cc/LEN6-9X3B]; see also Connie
Loizos, How to Stage an ICO (and Answers to Other Lingering Questions You Might Have),
TECHCRUNCH (May 24, 2017), https://techcrunch.com/2017/05/24/how-to-stage-an-ico-and-other-
related-questions-you-might-like-answered/ [https://perma.cc/56HG-4T3Y].
137 See Michael Oved, The Blockchain Killer App: Ethereum Tokens, CONSENSYS MEDIA
(Apr. 26, 2017), https://media.consensys.net/the-blockchain-killer-app-ethereum-tokens-
c3f5e6f4ce7f [https://perma.cc/A2AF-P6BN].
138 See id.
139 Note that, at present, ICOs are often conducted by DAOs or by other business entities.
In such circumstances, the appropriate system for analysis would be the DAO or the other busi-
ness entity. However, in the near term, next-generation ICOs are expected to emerge, which will
be automated. The goal of using ICOs as an example is to demonstrate that autonomous smart
contracts can be considered a business venture standing alone, under the right circumstances.
However, I recognize, as does the methodological approach I use in this Article, that not all
smart contracts used in DBEs will rise to the level of business entities standing alone.
140 See generally, e.g., Munchee, Inc., Securities Act Release No. 10445, 2017 SEC LEXIS
4005 (Dec. 11, 2017); see also Report of Investigation Pursuant to Section 21(a) of the Securities
Exchange Act of 1934: The DAO, Exchange Act Release No. 81207, 2017 SEC LEXIS 2194 (July
25, 2017) [hereinafter The DAO Report], https://www.sec.gov/litigation/investreport/34-81207
.pdf [https://perma.cc/429B-AZW5] (concluding that The DAO tokens were securities); Office of
Inv'r Educ. & Advocacy, Sec. & Exch. Comm'n, Investor Alert: Public Companies Making ICO-
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sumers. Although many such consumers invest in ICOs in pursuit of a
profit,141 few likely intend to assume unlimited joint and several liabil-
ity when purchasing a token. Imposing a partnership structure upon
tokenholders who participated in an ICO would thus run contrary to
the clearly articulated policy interest in protecting consumer interests
in the ICO context. If an ICO smart contract might be treated as a
business entity by operation of law, ICO creators should have the op-
tion of forming a different entity under common law-one that offers,
at the very least, limited liability status.
3. DAOs as Partnerships
Some DAOs, created as a tool for two or more persons to carry
on a joint association for the pursuit of profit, neatly fit the classic
default business-entity form of a partnership. The DAO offers a clear
example of such a venture. Participants in The DAO contributed as-
sets and entered into an agreement with other contributors as to how
they would work through The DAO to manage and profit from those
assets.142 The DAO participants agreed on how to share profits gener-
ated from their activities.14 3 Without more, The DAO represented a
classic case of the inadvertent partnership-creation of a partnership
even though the participants did not realize the legal consequences of
doing so under business entity law.144 If the only available common-
law'4 5 business form is a general partnership, however, some DAOs
created for entirely different ends would be forced to labor under a
structure of unlimited joint and several liability and lack of separate
Related Claims, INVESTOR.Gov (Aug. 28, 2017), https://www.investor.gov/additional-resources/
news-alerts/alerts-bulletins/investor-alert-public-companies-making-ico-related [https://perma.cc/
DSU2-PCUF] (warning of potential fraud in the ICO market); Press Release, Sec. & Exch.
Comm'n, SEC Emergency Action Halts ICO Scam (Dec. 4, 2017), https://www.sec.gov/news/
press-release/2017-219 [https://perma.ccl72SD-5LHJ]; Press Release, Sec. & Exch. Comm'n,
SEC Exposes Two Initial Coin Offering Purportedly Backed by Real Estate and Diamonds
(Sept. 29, 2017), https://www.sec.gov/news/press-release/2017-185-0 [https://perma.cc/J9ZM-
42YT].
141 See Jeff John Roberts, Why Tech Investors Love ICOs-and Lawyers Don't, FORTUNE
(June 26, 2017), http://fortune.com/2017/06/26/ico-initial-coin-offering-investing/ [https://perma
.cc/NR7M-27AE].
142 Bannon, supra note 95.
143 Id.
144 Supra note 114. In fact, in its recent ruling on The DAO token sale, the Securities Ex-
change Commission referred to The DAO as "an unincorporated organization," which might be
read as recognition of The DAO's partnership status. See The DAO Report, supra note 140, at
*1.
145 For more detail on why an additional common-law entity, rather than a statutory entity,
is needed, see infra Section II.B.
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legal personhood. Such outcomes are likely to stifle innovation in an
area of technology with unique potential to encourage it.
Take, for example, the remarkable case of the Plantoid. "A Plan-
toid is the plant equivalent of an android; it is a robot or synthetic
organism designed to look, act and grow like a plant."146 Each Plan-
toid exists in two parts: the metallic sculpture the public sees and ap-
preciates and the smart contract code that exists on the Ethereum
protocol and powers the Plantoid.147 Essentially, each Plantoid is a
metallic sculpture displayed in a public place.148 This metallic sculp-
ture is powered by a set of smart contracts, a DAO, that resides on the
Ethereum protocol and manages the Plantoid's life cycle and affairs. 149
When a passerby appreciates the Plantoid's beauty, he or she can send
a token of appreciation to the Plantoid by sending cryptocurrency to
the Plantoid's wallet.150 The Plantoid will respond with a display of
some kind-a mechanical dance or small light show.51 The funds re-
ceived then belong to the DAO powering the Plantoid; that is, the
funds belong to the Plantoid itself.15 2 The smart contracts running the
DAO require that when the Plantoid accumulates sufficient funds, the
Plantoid will request proposals from artists to create a new Plantoid.153
The creators of Plantoids view Plantoids and the DAOs that operate
them as an opportunity to change the way the public thinks about art,
its creation, and the value passed to artists for their contributions.154




149 Giulio Prisco, Plantoids: The First Blockchain-Based Artificial Life Forms, BrrcolN
MAG. (Dec. 26, 2016, 11:15 AM), https://bitcoinmagazine.comlarticles/plantoids-the-first-
blockchain-based-artificial-life-forms-1482768916 [https://perma.cc/864G-5MPX].
150 Id.
151 Grace Caffyn, This Robot Plant Needs You and Bitcoin to Reproduce, CoiNDESK (up-
dated Nov. 4, 2015), http://www.coindesk.comlthis-robot-plant-needs-you-and-bitcoin-to-
reproduce/ [https://perma.cc[HNA5-BJSN].
152 See id.
153 See id.; Prisco, supra note 149.
154 Etienne Verbist, Primavera De Filippi: "As an Artist, I Try to Challenge the Current
State of the World. . . ," ARTDEPENDENCE MAG. (May 19, 2017), https://www.artdependence
.com/articles/primavera-de-filippi-as-an-artist-i-try-to-challenge-the-current-state-of-the-world
[https://perma.cc/94BJ-RLH7] ("My dream is to show that it is nowadays possible to shift away
from traditional conception of copyright law, which is based on the notion of scarcity and exclu-
sivity. With blockchain technology, the model of copyright can be shifted around. Instead of
funding an artist, with the expectation that the artist will continue to produce new works that we
enjoy, it now becomes possible to fund directly the art piece itself, which will be in charge of
selecting and hiring the artists that will be responsible for its reproduction." (emphases
omitted)).
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The Plantoid creators also believe that Plantoids "do not have any
legal personality-because the law does not (yet) recognize them as a
legal entity."155
A case could be made, however, that because all contributing art-
ists are compensated not only with the funds for their specific Plantoid
sculpture, but also with perpetual future royalties from the enterprise,
that the Plantoid DAOs represent partnerships. A Plantoid DAO rep-
resents the joint association of two or more artists for the pursuit of
profit through Plantoid creation. The result would be unlimited joint
and several liability for each Plantoid creator. Faced with such reali-
ties, artists would reasonably be expected not to contribute to Plan-
toid art, and the greater social experiment represented by the Plantoid
will go unfulfilled. In other words, DAOs enable economic activity to
be structured in ways that fill radically different functions than are
historically filled by the typical general partnership. For such DAOs,
partnership treatment makes little sense as a policy matter. Instead,
such DAOs would benefit from a common-law form that offers both
limited liability and separate legal personhood.
B. Practical Obstacles to Incorporation or LLC Formation
As the above discussion makes clear, granting limited liability
and legal personhood to DBEs would resolve the tensions created by
treatment as a partnership. While it is true that modern statutes made
corporate or LLC formation simple and inexpensive,156 practical con-
siderations may cause those creating or contributing to DBEs not to
do so. For example, if the sole concern of a DBE developer is reduc-
tion of tort liability for potential programming mistakes, incorporation
or formation of an LLC will do little to reduce that risk.157 As a result,
the paperwork may be more trouble than it is worth,1 58 pointing to the
155 A Bionic Creature, supra note 146.
156 Whether commenters view the grant of limited liability only to those who file forms
with the state wise or not, all agree that the filings are easy. See, e.g., MODEL BUS. CORP. Acr
§ 2.04 cmt. (AM. BAR Ass'N 2005) ("Incorporation under modem statutes is so simple and inex-
pensive that a strong argument may be made that nothing short of filing articles of incorporation
should create the privilege of limited liability."); Bayern, supra note 115, at 607 ("Given how
easy it is to avoid this liability by means of entirely formal planning, it is unclear why the law
should preserve it at all." (footnote omitted)).
157 See Bayern, supra note 29, at 270 ("Too often, people misunderstand the liability-shield-
ing role of an LLC; while it does shield members from vicarious liability as members, it does not
exempt individuals from liability for their own torts." (citing SHAWN J. BAYERN, CLOSELY HELD
ORGANIZATIONS 245 (2014))).
158 See id. ("As a result, a selfish software developer may have little reason to go through
the trouble of establishing an LLC.").
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importance of a common-law option that offers the same rights and
responsibilities of corporations.
Moving beyond questions of risk, current corporate statutes will
simply struggle to accommodate the incorporation of many DBEs. For
example, modern corporation statutes require that a corporation's
board of directors be composed of natural persons.159 Further, even
where applicable law allows a shareholders agreement to eliminate
the board of directors, "corporate law still appears to impose a re-
quirement that there be at least one shareholder[, a]nd shareholders
must be legal persons."160 As a result, it may be "impossible to create
an autonomous corporation-that is, one that does not require an
ongoing association with any natural persons."'6 While some DBEs at
each level of the technology (DLT protocols, smart contracts, and
DAOs) will have human operators that can take advantage of modern
corporation statutes,162 any fully autonomous DBEs, standing alone,
will be excluded from incorporation.163
Although Professor Shawn Bayern's work demonstrates that
LLC laws offer the flexibility for a human incorporator to create an
LLC and turn operation of that LLC over to an autonomous al-
159 See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 141(b) (2011) ("The board of directors of a corpora-
tion shall consist of 1 or more members, each of whom shall be a natural person."); MODEL Bus.
CoRp. Acr. § 8.03(a) (AM. BAR Ass'N 2010) ("A board of directors must consist of one or more
individuals . . . ."); id. § 1.40(13) ("'Individual' means a natural person."). Note that Professor
LoPucki argues that having a board at all, at least in Delaware, is a waivable provision, and an
entity could appoint another DBE to manage the corporation. See LoPucki, supra note 94, at
907. However, given the low practical likelihood of some DBE creators to engage the state to
form a business entity at all, the likelihood that those same creators would create a layered entity
structure seems even more remote.
160 Bayern, supra note 25, at 100 (footnote omitted); see MODEL Bus. CoRP. Acr § 6.01(b)
(AM. BAR Ass'N 2005) ("The articles of incorporation must authorize ... one or more classes or
series of shares that together have unlimited voting rights . . . ."); id. § 1.40(21) ("'Shareholder'
means the person in whose name shares are registered . . . .").
161 Bayern, supra note 25, at 98. But see generally LoPucki, supra note 94, for a possible
layered approach that could potentially resolve Bayern's objection.
162 In fact, some DLT protocol creators have created human-managed corporations to man-
age the technology. Consider, for example, Symbiont, a Delaware corporation that created its
own protocol, called Assembly, and R3 CEV LLC, the distributed database technology company
that leads a consortium of financial institutions in developing the Corda protocol. See Technol-
ogy, Symorer AsSEMBLY, https://symbiont.io/technology/ [https://perma.cc/SDU3-V422]; Team,
SYMmoNT ASSEMBLY https://symbiont.io/team/ [https://perma.cc/P3LY-4KPX]; The R3 Story,
R3, https://www.r3.com/about/ [https://perma.cc/8DLH-BZVQ]. I do not know, as of this writing,
of any smart contracts or DAOs that are operated by people who incorporated their business
venture.
163 See, e.g., Learn About Tezos, TEZOs, www.tezos.com, and the Bitcoin blockchain. For
LoPucki's theory to work, the DBE would need at least one other layered DBE. See LoPucki,
supra note 94. Therefore, a DBE, standing alone, could not incorporate.
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gorithm,64 the reality of the Cypherpunk culture 65 underlying many
DBEs is that some will simply prefer not to form an LLC under state
laws. Normally, such a choice would earn the default treatment of a
general partnership, however, in light of the policy considerations dis-
cussed above, partnership treatment is counterproductive in this con-
text. Furthermore, in certain circumstances, it will be practically
impossible to form the DBE as an LLC. Ultimately, then, to escape
the undesirable results of general partnership treatment, those DBEs
that are unable, for one reason or another, to take advantage of gen-
eral corporation or LLC statutes need a different common-law-entity
option.
C. Considering DBEs Within Prevailing Theories of the Firm
Points to an Alternative Entity Option
Examining DBEs through the lens of many of the prevailing the-
ories of the nature and purpose of the firm reveals both incongruities
and synergies. The idea that prevailing theories of the corporation and
other formal entities only incongruously map to business ventures re-
lying on emerging technology is not a new phenomenon. Just as the
first DLT protocol (the Bitcoin blockchain) emerged in 2009, the
"Sharing Economy"166 hit mainstream, with companies like Uber,
Lyft, and Airbnb striving to "democratiz[e] how we produce, con-
sume, govern, and solve social problems." 67 Sharing Economy busi-
nesses experiment with organizational models that "reduce the need
for capital-intensive infrastructure (such as hotels) and durable goods
(such as cars) since the excess capacity in these spaces and goods is
exploited."6 s The Sharing Economy challenges the present under-
164 See Bayern, supra note 25, at 100; Bayern, supra note 29, at 268.
165 The Cypherpunks were a group of cryptographers working in a multistakeholder, col-
laborative manner to produce technologically innovative tools allowing for regulation without
sacrificing privacy. See DrEDRICH, supra note 33, at 253-55. The Bitcoin blockchain was born
from the Cypherpunk work and carries with it a strong flavor of the Cypherpunk culture of civil
disobedience and libertarianism. Id at 259-60; see also Eric Hughes, A Cypherpunk's Manifesto
(Mar. 9, 1993), https://www.activism.net/cypherpunk/manifesto.html [https://perma.cclPVN6-
LCAW].
166 Although it is clear that a definitional debate persists in the literature regarding the
Sharing Economy, this Article borrows the definition of Sharing Economy used by Abbey Stem-
ler, as follows: "all businesses that utilize platforms to connect people who have goods and ser-
vices to offer with those who are willing to purchase them." Abbey Stemler, The Myth of the
Sharing Economy and Its Implications for Regulating Innovation, 67 EMORY L.J. 197, 199 n.12
(2017).
167 About, SHAREABLE, https://www.shareable.netlabout [https://perma.cc/ACY8-KKF3].
168 Stemler, supra note 166, at 202.
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standing of the nature and purpose of the corporation.169 DBEs, as a
potential new wave of corporate decentralization and an extension of
the peer-to-peer roots of the Sharing Economy,170 also present a new
challenge to prevailing theories of the firm. Notably, however, DBEs
also converge with elements of several theories of the firm. Those con-
vergences are most prevalent in theories that emphasize contracts,
complexity, and flexibility. Those three characteristics, in turn, point
toward making an alternative common-law business entity form avail-
able to DBEs-the business trust.
Theories of the nature of corporations abound.171 In sum, "the
corporation has been described as: (1) an entity; (2) an aggregate of
people; (3) a web of contracts; (4) a government concession or
'franchise government'; (5) a collection of specific investments; . . .
(6) the property of its shareholders";172 and (7) a complex system.173
The emergence of DBEs may provide support for the rise of systems
thinking in relation to the nature of the firm because DBEs do not fit
neatly into any of the other theories. DBEs challenge the entity the-
ory of the corporation because they represent legally recognized busi-
ness entities with all the hallmarks of a corporation but are not a
"Frankenstein monster which States have created by their corporation
laws."1 74 DBEs also strain the government concession theory of the
corporation because their creators ground their "constitution-
alDNA"'s7 in computer code rather than state incorporation laws and
many DBE structures purport to avoid perceived inefficiencies and
undesirable elements of state governments.7 6
169 See Orly Lobel, The Law of the Platform, 101 MINN. L. REv. 87, 89-90 (2016) ("[T]he
platform economy is radically changing the traditional equilibria of supply and demand, blurring
the lines between owners and users, producers and consumers, workers and contractors, and
transcending the spatial divides of personal and professional, business and home, market and
leisure, friend and client, acquaintance and stranger, public and private.").
170 See discussion and citations infra Section IV.C.
171 See generally David Million, Theories of the Corporation, 1990 DuKE L.J. 201.
172 Belinfanti & Stout, supra note 97, at 586; see also Lynn Stout, The Economic Nature of
the Corporation, in 2 THE OxFoRD HANDBOOK OF LAW AND ECONOMICS 337, 343-48 (Fran-
cesco Parisi ed., 2017).
173 Belinfanti & Stout, supra note 97, at 630 (arguing that systems theory "provides an
approach to understanding the nature and purpose of corporate entities that is not only consis-
tent with elements of many otherwise-conflicting visions of the firm, but also with important
features of corporate law and practice").
174 Ligget v. Lee, 288 U.S. 517, 567 (1933) (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
175 See, e.g., infra note 239.
176 "The state concession theory of the corporation and its modern descendant, the political
franchise theory, recognizes the role of the state in granting a corporation legal personhood and
acknowledges that a corporation's internal governance structures in many ways mirror govern-
ance structures of a political state." Belinfanti & Stout, supra note 97, at 588.
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Similarly, as the cases of the Plantoid and ICO demonstrate, not
all DBEs are made up entirely of natural persons. Computer code
may autonomously operate key aspects of DBEs, without further
human involvement, leaving DBEs to cut against the aggregate the-
ory.177 DBEs challenge the team production theory of corporations
because DBEs disintermediate the role of the "mediating hierar-
chy." 178 All types of DBEs (DAOs, smart contracts, and DLT proto-
cols) entrust protection of specific investments made in the DBE to
both the manager and to the protocol, rather than solely to a board of
directors.1 79 Unlike the relationship between a board of directors and
a corporation's articles of incorporation and bylaws, a manager of a
DBE cannot act contrary to the principles of the underlying DLT pro-
tocol.1 8 0 In other words, in the DBE context, it is not business organi-
zation or corporation law that "fill[s] in the gaps where team members
have found explicit contracting difficult or impossible";181 the DLT
protocol and the DBE smart contracts do. Finally, when viewed as a
DBE, a DLT protocol represents a bold example of the failure of the
shareholder-ownership model of corporations. It is undisputed, for ex-
ample, that no one person or entity owns the Bitcoin blockchain.182
Certainly, no holder of bitcoin believes that she or he owns the
Bitcoin blockchain, nor expects to receive any residual value from the
Bitcoin blockchain if it ever fails entirely.183
The two existing theories of the firm that best map to DBEs are
the nexus-of-contracts and systems theories. The nexus-of-contracts
theory "views the corporation as a web or 'nexus' of explicit and im-
177 The aggregate theory "describe[s] corporations as being 'composed' of human beings."
Stout, supra note 172, at 344.
178 Margaret M. Blair & Lynn A. Stout, A Team Production Theory of Corporate Law, 85
VA. L. REV. 247, 250 (1999) ("We argue that public corporation law can offer a second-best
solution to team production problems because it allows rational individuals who hope to profit
from team production to overcome shirking and rent-seeking by opting into an internal govern-
ance structure we call the 'mediating hierarchy."' (footnote omitted)).
179 See TAPscoTT & TAPscorr, supra note 29, at 40.
180 At least, they could not do so easily. Acting contrary to the protocol would require the
trustees to gain control of more than the required consensus level of nodes. In the Bitcoin
blockchain context, this is referred to as the "51% attack." See TAPSCOTT & TAPscoTr, supra
note 29, at 269.
181 See Blair & Stout, supra note 177, at 254.
182 Murck, supra note 29, at 1-2 ("[B]lockchain networks rely on a decentralized infrastruc-
ture that can't be controlled by any one person or group.. . . No single party controls the data or
the information."); see also TAPSCOTT & TAPSCOTrT, supra note 29, at 6 (explaining the Bitcoin
blockchain is "distributed: it runs on computers provided by volunteers around the world").
183 Belinfanti & Stout, supra note 97, at 590 (describing the idea that shareholders own
corporations and that shareholders are the residual claimants in corporations as two of three
common justifications for the shareholder-value theory of corporations).
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plicit contracts between and among various parties associated with the
firm, including shareholders, directors, officers, employees, and credi-
tors." 1 84 If the term "contract" expands to include smart contracts
(computer code that takes action based on the fulfillment of
predefined conditions), the nexus-of-contracts theory offers a rela-
tively strong fit. The default rules in the realm of DBEs are not de-
fined by state corporation statutes, but rather by the rules of the
underlying DLT protocol. 185 Like a choice between corporate statutes,
DBE creators choose the basic rules of their venture by selecting a
DLT protocol from the menu of choices available. Like the popular
Delaware statute, many DBEs select Ethereum for its robustness and
flexibility. As recognized by the nexus-of-contracts theory of corpora-
tions, after that initial choice, creators of DBEs may elect the govern-
ance system and organizational structure that best fits their goals.
DBEs will hire "Contractors"-persons or entities external to the
DBE that will provide some service-in order to take action. In addi-
tion to the nexus-of-contract theory, systems theory, with deep roots
in computer science, also maps extremely well to DBEs. Systems the-
ory encourages analysis of the multiple levels of DBEs introduced in
this Article and offers the cognitive space to view them as simultane-
ously independent and interlocking entities.
Both the nexus-of-contract and system theories of the firm, as ap-
plied to DBEs, point to a need for a legally recognizable business en-
tity that is rooted in contracts and offers the flexibility necessary to
accommodate the complexity of the underlying technology. Mean-
while, the incongruous results from applying partnership law to DBEs
make typical corporate constructs of limited liability and separate le-
gal personhood a necessity. Under modern statutes, those who find it
worthwhile and situationally appropriate to do so might choose to
form an LLC and then turn operation of the LLC over to the DBE.18 6
In some circumstances, the DBE creator will choose not to do so. In
other circumstances, it will be technically impossible to do so. When
Rockefeller was in a position where the corporate statutes did not rec-
ognize his business model and the other common-law forms were in-
appropriate for one practical reason or another, but he still wanted
the benefits of incorporation, Rockefeller turned to the business trust.
184 Stout, supra note 172, at 346; see also Belinfanti & Stout, supra note 97, at 586-87 (citing
Frank H. Easterbrook & Daniel R. Fischel, Limited Liability and the Corporation, 52 U. CHI. L.
REv. 89 (1985); Melvin A. Eisenberg, The Conception that the Corporation Is a Nexus of Con-
tracts and the Dual Nature of the Firm, 24 J. CoRP. L. 819, 822 (1998)).
185 See TAPscoTT & TAPscoTr, supra note 29, at 269.
186 See generally Bayern, supra note 25; Bayern, supra note 29.
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If Rockefeller were a coder developing a DBE, he would structure the
DBE as a business trust.
III. A TAXONOMY OF DECENTRALIZED BUSINESS TRUSTS AS AN
ALTERNATIVE BUsINESs-ENTy OPTION
This Part first outlines the structure of the business trust, illustrat-
ing its use through Rockefeller's Standard Oil Trust and detailing ele-
ments required to create a business trust today. This Part then builds a
taxonomy of decentralized business trusts, arguing that DBEs at each
level of DLT can be constructed as business trusts in order to resolve
the difficulties associated with structuring DBEs as partnerships,
LLCs, or corporations. To do so, this Part starts at the protocol level
and then considers smart contracts and DAOs. Examining the three
levels of technology separately structures the discussion within the
framework offered by systems analysis.
Systems analysis views a system as consisting of coordinated and
interconnected elements that "operate as a unified whole to serve a
given function or purpose."18 7 Systems analysis recognizes that these
interconnected elements influence each other even as they work to-
gether.88 Furthermore, systems theory teaches that each system may
be part of another, larger system.189 Thus, examining each level of
DBEs separately reveals areas where each system and subsystem in-
fluences the function of other systems and subsystems. Allowing ana-
lytical space to capture the complexity inherent in DBEs enables
further analysis of broader, complex effects that DBEs should be ex-
pected to have on the law.
A. The Structure of a Business Trust
Historically, the business trust offered profit-seeking associations
of persons "limited liability, entity shielding, capital lock-in, tradable
shares, [and] legal personhood"-just as though the owners had
formed a corporation.90 Unlike the traditional trust, which centers on
187 Belinfanti & Stout, supra note 97, at 599.
188 Id. at 600.
189 Id. at 601 ("A second fundamental principle of systems thinking is that systems can be
fractal, in the sense that they can be comprised of subsystems, which, in turn, are comprised of
other subsystems, and so on, ad infinitum. Conversely, a system typically can also be described as
a subsystem of another larger system." (footnote omitted)).
190 John Morley, The Common Law Corporation: The Power of the Trust in Anglo-Ameri-
can Business History, 116 COLUM. L. REv. 2145, 2146 (2016). The idea that one or more of these
characteristics-limited liability, entity shielding, capital lock-in, transferable shares, and legal
personhood-constitute the hallmark of a corporation is deeply embedded in corporate-law
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a gift from a settlor to one or more beneficiaries,191 "the business trust
is similar to a corporation in its 'general scheme of organization and
business operations,' and is 'established to run a business enter-
prise."'n9 Although the business trust enjoyed its height of popularity
when law made incorporation cumbersome and placed severe restric-
tions on the corporate form,'9 3 many state laws preserve the institution
of the business trust.194 Today, business trusts remain in common us-
age for "the structuring of mutual funds, in real estate investment
trusts, and in asset securitization."19 5
literature. See, e.g., Stout, supra note 172, at 338-43; Lynn A. Stout, On the Nature of Corpora-
tions, 2005 U. ILL. L. REV. 253, 254 (citing ROBERT CHARLES CLARK, CORPORATE LAW 2
(1986); Steven A. Bank, Federalizing the Tax-Free Merger: Toward an End to the Anachronistic
Reliance on State Corporation Laws, 77 N.C. L. REV. 1307, 1364-65 (1999)).
191 Chermside, supra note 25, § 2 ("The courts have frequently taken note of distinctions
between the Massachusetts or business trust and the conventional private trust. A fundamental
difference lies in the fact that the Massachusetts or business trust is primarily a vehicle for the
conduct of commercial enterprise, whereas the traditional trust is generally a device to conserve
and protect property. The Massachusetts or business trust also differs from the conventional
trust in the manner in which it is created. Investors in a business trust in effect pool their re-
sources in a mutual, consensual, contractual relationship as between themselves and with the
trustees. On the other hand, in the conventional private trust the interests of the beneficiaries
arise from the gift or grant of the settlor of the trust, and no element of mutual contract contrib-
utes to the creation of the trust relationship.").
192 Jonathan J. Ossip, Diversity Jurisdiction and Trusts, 89 N.Y.U. L. REV. 2301, 2313
(2014) (footnote omitted) (quoting 16A FLETCHER CYCLOPEDIA OF THE LAW OF CORPORA-
TIONS § 8227 (rev. 2003); Thales Alenia Space Fr. v. Thermo Funding Co., 989 F. Supp. 2d 287,
296 (S.D.N.Y. 2013)).
193 See Morley, supra note 186, at 2164 ("The business trust was thus widespread in the
United States as a regulation-light alternative to the corporate form."); Thomas E. Rutledge &
Christopher E. Schaefer, The Trust as an Entity and Diversity Jurisdiction: Is Navarro Applicable
to the Modem Business Trust?, 48 REAL PROP., TR. & EST. L.J. 83, 87 (2013).
194 These states include, at a minimum, Arkansas, California, Colorado, Delaware, Geor-
gia, Indiana, Massachusetts, Michigan, Mississippi, North Carolina, Rhode Island, South Caro-
lina, Tennessee, Utah, Vermont, and Washington. See ARK. CODE ANN. § 4-31-401 (2016); Betts
v. Hackathorn, 252 S.W. 602 (Ark. 1923); Goldwater v. Oltman 292 P. 624, 627 (Cal. 1930));
COLO. REV. STAT. § 15-10-201(6.5) (2017); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 12, § 3801 (2018); Ovrevik v.
Ovrevik, 527 S.E.2d 586, 588 (Ga. Ct. App. 2000); IND. CODE § 23-5-1-2 (2017); Williams v.
Milton, 215 Mass. 1 (1913); MICH. Comp. LAWS ANN. § 700.7402 (West 2010); Peoples Bank v.
D'Lo Royalties, Inc. 235 So. 2d 257 (Miss. 1970)); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 55-1-40(9) (2017); Roberts
v. Aberdeen-S. Pines Syndicate, 151 S.E. 865 (N.C. 1930); Courtemanche v. Bibbo, No. 03-6649,
2004 R.I. Super. LEXIS 178 (R.I. Super. Ct. Oct. 5, 2004)); S.C. CODE ANN. § 62-7-105 (2007);
TENN. CODE ANN. § 48-101-202 to -203 (2012); UTAH CODE ANN. § 48-3a-1001 (LexisNexis
2015); Carriage House, Inc. v. Gabelhart, 146 B.R. 352 (D. Vt. 1992); WASH. REV. CODE ANN.
§ 23.90.020 (West 2013).
195 Oh, supra note 25, at 268 ("Yet no one doubts that trusts are the dominant form for
massive employee pensions and mutual funds, as well as for a myriad of asset securitization and
structured finance transactions."); Rutledge & Schaefer, supra note 193, at 90 (footnote omitted)
(citing TAMAR FRANKEL, SECuRITIZATION: STRUCTURED FINANCING, FINANCIAL ASSET POOIS,
AND ASSET-BACKED SECURITIES (1991 & Supp. 1995)); STEVEN L. SCHWARCz, STRaucrURED
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Generally, states that continue to recognize the common-law bus-
iness trust view it as an unincorporated association carried on for
profit 96 created at common law by an agreement.9 7 Under the agree-
ment creating the trust, property is held and managed by trustees for
the benefit and profit of the owners of the trust.198 Owners of the trust
hold freely transferable certificates representing their ownership stake
in the trust property.'" The certificate-holders are often referred to as
"shareholders,"200 and many states recognize limited liability for the
certificate holders.2 0 1 Notably, this limited-liability grant is generally
limited by the rule that
FINANCE, A GUIDE TO THE PRINCIPLES OF ASSET SECURITIZATION (3d ed. 2002); Sheldon A.
Jones, Laura M. Moret & James M. Storey, The Massachusetts Business Trust and Registered
Investment Companies, 13 DEL. J. CORP. L. 421 (1988); Steven L Schwarcz, The Alchemy of
Asset Securitization, 1 STAN. J.L. Bus. & FIN. 133 (1994) [hereinafter Schwarcz, The Alchemy of
Asset Securitization]); Steven L. Schwarcz, Commercial Trusts as Business Organizations: Unrav-
eling the Mystery, 58 Bus. LAw. 559, 559 (2003) [hereinafter Schwarcz, Commercial Trusts as
Business Organizations] ("In a seeming incongruity, trusts have come to dominate certain types
of modem business and financial transactions.").
196 Ossip, supra note 192, at 2313 ("The primary characteristic of the business trust is that it
is organized 'as a device for profit making through the combination of capital contributed by a
number of investors."' (quoting 5 Am-Y M. HEss, GEORGE G. BOGERT & GEORGE T. BOGERT,
THE LAW OF TRUSTS AND TRUSTEEs § 247 (3d ed. 2007))).
197 Id. at 2312 (quoting 13 Am. JUR. 2D Business Trusts § 1 (rev. 2013)); see also, e.g.,
WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 23.90.020 (West 2013) (defining a business trust as follows: "A Massa-
chusetts trust is an unincorporated business association created at common law by an instru-
ment'. . . for the benefit and profit of such persons as may be or may become the holders of
transferable certificates evidencing beneficial interests in the trust estate"); Chermside, supra
note 25, § 2 ("Modem cases support the view that a business trust is an unincorporated business
organization created by an instrument by which property is to be held and managed by trustees
for the benefit and profit of such persons as may be or become the holders of transferable certifi-
cates evidencing the beneficial interests in the trust estate."); John H. Langbein, The Secret Life
of the Trust: The Trust as an Instrument of Commerce, 107 YALE L.J. 165, 178 (1997) ("[T]he
data leaves me on solid ground in asserting .. . that well above 90% of the wealth in trusts in the
United States is held in commercial as opposed to personal trusts.").
198 See, e.g., Ryan A. Christy, Redefining the Juridical Person: Examining the Business Trust
and Other Unincorporated Associations for Citizenship Purposes, 6 Duo. Bus. L.J. 137, 138
(2004) ("A business trust is an unincorporated association created by a voluntary act, based on
contract, of the owners of property or property interests for the purpose of carrying on some
kind of business or commercial activity for profit." (footnote omitted)); Ossip, supra note 192, at
2312-13 (explaining "property is to be held and managed by trustees . . . 'as a device for profit
making"' for the owners of the trust (quoting HEss, BOGERT & BOGERT, supra note 196)).
199 See, e.g., Christy, supra note 198, at 138 ("Beneficial interests in the trust estate and in
the profits produced by the trust are evidenced by transferable certificates, similar to corporate
shares . . . ."); Ossip, supra note 192, at 2314 ("[Beneficiaries of business trusts] hold 'certificates
evidencing beneficial interests in the trust estate,' and these certificates are typically transfer-
rable." (footnote omitted)).
200 See Ossip, supra note 192, at 2314 (citing 16A FLETCHER CYCLOPEDIA OF THE LAW OF
CORPORATIONS, supra note 192, § 8240; Jones, Moret & Storey, supra note 195, at 423).
201 See, e.g., WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 23.90.020 (West 2013) ("[T]he holders of ... certifi-
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[w]here, under the declaration of trust, the unit holders re-
tain control over the trustees and have authority to control
the management of the business, the partnership relation ex-
ists. On the other hand, where the declaration of trust gives
the trustees full control in the management of the business of
the trust and the certificate holders are not associated in car-
rying on the business and have no control over the trustees,
then there is no liability as partners.202
Business-trust certificate-holders basically possess the same role as
shareholders-they possess the power to "elect, control, and remove
the trustees, and also to amend the trust instrument."203 The trustees
act as directors, offering centralized management similar to that found
in a corporation204 and owing fiduciary duties to the certificate-hold-
ers.20 5 In particular, trustees owe the same duty of care that directors
owe a corporation-that of an ordinarily prudent person under the
circumstances.206
Examining the organization of Rockefeller's Standard Oil Trust
illuminates the elements of the business trust. Those companies inter-
ested in participating in the Standard Oil Trust created a Standard Oil
Company in the state where their assets were located.207 Participating
companies then transferred their assets to those Standard Oil Compa-
nies.208 The shareholders of the Standard Oil Companies in each state
then contributed their Standard Oil Company stock to the Standard
Oil Trust.20 9 Thus, the shareholders of each Standard Oil Company
cates [evidencing beneficial interests in the trust estate] are entitled to the same limitation of
personal liability extended to stockholders of private corporations."); Goldwater v. Oltman, 292
P. 624, 629 (Cal. 1930).
202 Schumann-Heink v. Folsom, 159 N.E. 250, 253 (Ill. 1927) (citations omitted); see Peoples
Bank v. D'Lo Royalties, Inc., 235 So. 2d 257, 264 (Miss. 1970). For early academic assessments of
the dividing line between a partnership and a Massachusetts business trust, see Henry J. Aaron,
The Massachusetts Trust as Distinguished from Partnership, 12 ILL. L. REv. 482, 482-83 (1918);
Robert C. Brown, Common Law Trusts as Business Enterprises, 3 IND. L.J. 595, 598-603 (1928).
203 Ossip, supra note 192, at 2314 (citing 16A FLETCHER CYCLOPEDIA OF THE LAW OF
CORPORATIONs, supra note 192, § 8240).
204 Id. (citing 13 AM. JUR. 2D Business Trusts, supra note 197, § 6).
205 Chermside, supra note 25, § 2 ("Trustees of a Massachusetts or business trust occupy a
fiduciary relationship toward the holders of certificates of beneficial interests therein."); id.
§ 40[a] (citing cases). Promoters of the business trust also owe fiduciary duties to the certificate-
holders and to the trust. Id. §§ 2, 42.
206 Id. § 2.
207 Collins, supra note 5, at 2316. This allowed each company to comply with that state's
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became the beneficiaries of the Standard Oil Trust.210 In return for
each contribution of stock valued at $100, the beneficiaries received
one Standard Oil Trust certificate.21 1 The beneficiaries elected nine
trustees to manage the trust. Because the Standard Oil Trust con-
trolled the stock of the Standard Oil Companies, the trustees effec-
tively controlled all the Standard Oil Companies.212 Standard Oil
Company dividends were paid to the Standard Oil Trust, and the
trustees distributed dividends according to the trust certificates held
by the beneficiaries.2 1 3 The Standard Oil Trust organization demon-
strates the practical impact of the business-trust form: The benefi-
ciaries are entitled to profits proportional to their contribution in the
trust, but the trustees hold the sole power to direct the operations of
the trust. Under the law of contract, of course, the beneficiaries retain
the right to amend the contract that comprises the trust agreement.
Where properly created, many states also treat business trusts as
separate entities, recognizing a form of (un)corporate personhood.2 14
Thus, business trusts can sue and be sued.215 Some states explicitly
provide that business trusts receive the full benefit of the law applica-
ble to corporations.216 Although some of these states require a busi-
ness trust operating within their jurisdiction to file the declaration of





214 See, e.g., Portico Mgmt. Grp., LLC v. Harrison, 136 Cal. Rptr. 3d 151, 159 (Cal. Dist. Ct.
App. 2011); 13 AM. JUR. 2D Business Trusts, supra note 197, § 3 (noting several courts and
statutory schemes recognize business trusts as distinct legal entities); Recent Case, Trusts-The
Business Trust as a Legal Entity, 9 TEx. L. REv. 299, 300 (1931) ("[A] Massachusetts trust is
held ... to be a legal entity, owning a note in its own name, on which it alone, and not the
trustees, could sue.").
215 See, e.g., First Union Nat'l Bank ex rel. Se. Timber Leasing Statutory Tr. v. Pictet Over-
seas Tr. Corp., 351 F.3d 810, 814 (8th Cir. 2003) ("Some states also now recognize the so-called
'business' or 'Massachusetts' trust. Unlike traditional trusts, this form of business organization
gives the trust powers to sue and be sued in its own name and usually subjects trust assets to
execution and attachment in the same manner as corporate assets." (citations omitted)); Harri-
son, 136 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 159; Boyd v. Boulevard Nat'l Bank, 306 So. 2d 551, 553 (Fla. Dist. Ct.
App. 1975) (holding that a Massachusetts business trust is "a separate legal entity for the pur-
pose of being sued").
216 See, e.g., WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 23.90.040(4) (West 2013); State ex rel. Combs v.
Hopping Inv. Co., 269 P.2d 997 (Okla. 1954).
217 See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 12, § 3801(g)(2) (2018); Miss. CODE ANN. § 79-16-33
(West 2014); TENN. CODE ANN. § 48-101-204 (2012); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 23.90.040(1).
218 See, e.g., ARK. CODE ANN. § 4-31-401 (2016); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 18-B, § 106
(2017); N.C. GEN. STAT. ANN. §§ 1-69.1, 55-1-40(9) (2017); UTAH CODE ANN. § 48-3a-1001
(LexisNexis 2015).
410 [Vol. 87:373
IF ROCKEFELLER WERE A CODER
mately then, when two or more persons entrust assets to one or more
trustees, giving the trustees complete control to manage the assets for
their profit, and the owners merely retain a certificate of ownership
entitling them to distribution of profits, the common law of many
states continues to recognize the creation of a separate legal entity
with limited liability, personhood, and agency-the business trust. If
DBEs can be formed to fit the business trust construct, then DBE
entrepreneurs will, like Rockefeller before them, have an alternative
business entity to rely upon-one that retains the flexibility of a part-
nership without the incongruous results and enjoys the benefits of a
corporation or LLC without enduring the practical and theoretical
mismatch.
B. DLT Protocols219 as Business Trusts22 0
If, as introduced above, instead of thinking of the DLT protocol
as the corporation, we consider the protocol to be the assets of the
business organization, the case for viewing DLT protocols as business
trusts crystalizes. Take the example used by Buterin and Larimer-the
Bitcoin blockchain.221 If the Bitcoin blockchain is the asset of the busi-
ness trust, the nodes with the power to validate transactions (gener-
ally, the miners) are the trustees.222 Such nodes possess the sole power
to vote on how to manage the asset.223 The nodes that validate trans-
actions decide when to adopt a hard fork and are responsible for
219 Recognizing that there are many ways to build and launch a DLT protocol and a variety
of underlying motivations for doing so exist, this analysis is particularly relevant for the
organization of public, open-source DLT protocols. Nevertheless, there are also situations in
which a consortium or company may be interested in organizing their permissioned protocol as a
business trust in order to further insulate the consortium members or the company from liability.
220 At this juncture, I would like to again thank Vlad Zamfir for bringing the original idea
of trying to map trust law to smart contracts to my attention. In a conversation around a table at
the Radisson Hotel in Nairobi, Kenya, after a full day of the COALA Blockchain Workshops,
Vlad chatted with Ryan Singer and me about his initial thoughts that trust law may map to smart
contracts. In that conversation, we considered what I have later learned was largely a donative-
trust model. Upon return from Nairobi, I determined that for a variety of reasons, the donative-
trust model did not map as well as we had hoped it would during that initial conversation in
Nairobi. The remainder of Part III details the model that I believe best maps to certain DAOs
and smart contracts, and that will (often) not require additional steps or interaction with the
government. For a different view, see Robert Herian, Trusteeship in a Post-Trust World:
Property, Trusts Law & the Blockchain (unpublished manuscript), https://www.academia.edul23
964505/Trusteeshipain aPost-TrustWorldPropertyjrrusts Law and-theBlockchain [https://
perma.ccTD38-EAWX].
221 See supra notes 104-06 and accompanying text.
222 Note that not all nodes are operated by miners, and not all nodes run what is referred to
as a "full node." See ANTONOPOULOS, supra note 30, at 172-75.
223 See id. at 172.
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reaching consensus on the evolution and existence of the present state
of the Bitcoin blockchain.224 As trustees, some nodes (the miners) pe-
riodically receive remuneration for their services, pursuant to the
rules of the protocol.2 2 5 Under this conception, individuals holding
bitcoin act as certificate holders. As Buterin and Larimer indicate,
bitcoins act as shares in the business trust-they represent he holder's
proportional entitlement to value generated by the Bitcoin blockchain
through the services it provides to the public. Bitcoin holders do not
have any right to manage the primary asset of the trust, the Bitcoin
blockchain. Bitcoin holders can only transfer their certificates to
others interested in buying into the business trust. The value of the
bitcoin, the certificate of proportional entitlement to value generated
by the Bitcoin blockchain, will depend upon the relative success of the
Bitcoin blockchain and the services it provides at any given time. As a
result, the Bitcoin blockchain itself could have been formed as a de-
centralized business trust.2 26
Admittedly, there are challenges to this construction of viewing
DLT protocols as business trusts.227 First, what exactly, constitutes the
trust instrument? Does the protocol code itself serve as the trust in-
strument, as intimated by Larimer when he analogizes it to the bylaws
of a corporation? Is it the white paper that sets out the vision for the
DLT protocol? Is it the genesis-block code which displays for the pub-
lic the specifications of the DLT protocol? Would any of these options
be recognized by a court as sufficient to satisfy the common-law re-
quirement that a trust instrument exist among the parties? Even if
not, there is no apparent reason that the creators of new DLT proto-
224 Cf Primavera De Filippi & Benjamin Loveluck, The Invisible Politics of Bitcoin: Gov-
ernance Crisis of a Decentralized Infrastructure, IrrERNET POL'Y REV., Sept. 30, 2016, at 1, 15.
225 ANTONOPOULOs, supra note 30, at 214.
226 I qualify this statement with "could have been" because arguably a clear contractual
commitment to forming a business trust should have been made at the initial launch of the
Bitcoin blockchain for a business trust to form. As Bayern said of LLCs, it might be difficult to
unwind the clock at this point. Nevertheless, the example stands-there is no reason that new
public, open-source protocols could not be formed as a business trust. See Bayern, supra note 29,
at 268.
227 I also recognize that the theory of decentralized business trusts, generally, faces a juris-
dictional challenge. How do participants in a decentralized business trust determine the applica-
ble common-law jurisdiction? What happens when certificate-holders of the decentralized
business trust reside in international jurisdictions? What happens when one or more of the trust-
ees resides in international jurisdictions? How do plaintiffs seeking to hold the decentralized
business trust accountable determine where to file suit? Given the diversity of state common law
and state statutes recognizing business trusts, what happens as the decentralized business trust's
economic activities cross state or national boundaries? These are big, important questions. As
such, I reserve them for separate and further research.
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cols, whether public, private, decentralized, or distributed, could not
specifically negotiate a trust agreement to accompany the new
protocol.
Second, do DLT protocol tokenholders endanger the business-
trust form when they use their tokens for utilitarian purposes rather
than for the purpose of transferring their economic interest in the
DLT protocol? For example, in the Ethereum protocol, programs run-
ning on Ethereum require ether, the Ethereum protocol token, to
function. Ether is regarded as fuel for economic activity on Ethereum
as much as evidence of ownership interest in some economic right.
When those holding ether use it to engage in economic activity on the
protocol, do they inadvertently cross the common-law test dividing
business trusts from partnerships? If so, does it destroy the limited
liability of all ether-holders, or only as to those putting their tokens to
economic use? Irrespective of these challenges, the possibility that if
designed with these issues in mind, a DLT protocol could assume the
organizational form of a business trust results in an astounding pro-
position: a DLT protocol may be recognized as having legal personal-
ity. In other words, a blockchain may be recognized as a person. Even
the mere possibility for this proposition to come to fruition opens
unique and important lines of inquiry for issues of corporate govern-
ance, DLT protocol governance, and the doctrine of corporate
personhood.
C. Smart Contracts as Business Trusts
Smart contracts, even when they do not rise to the level of com-
plexity of a DAO, "can own tokens, participate in crowdsales, and
even be voting members of other contracts."2 8 If the smart contract
itself, using internal, predetermined, coded logic, holds assets on be-
half of tokenholders, then the smart contract itself could act as the
trustee in a business trust. Here, investors in the business trust would
commit assets to the smart contract in exchange for certificate tokens.
The certificate tokens would represent he holder's proportional own-
ership interest in the profits of the business trust and would entitle the
holder to vote on proposals to alter the smart contract's underlying
code under certain circumstances.229 The smart contract, for its part,
would hold the assets committed to it on behalf of, and would exploit
those assets for the profit of, the certificate tokenholders. The smart
228 Decentralized Autonomous Organization, ETHEREUM, https://www.ethereum.org/dao
[https://perma.cc/2KXE-3MYU].
229 Assuming, of course, that doing so is technically feasible.
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contract would be programmed to distribute any excess value earned
from its activities to the certificate tokenholders at certain intervals. If
the certificate tokenholder agreed to a trust agreement at the time of
exchanging assets for certificate tokens, the trust-instrument require-
ment would also be satisfied. As a result, a business trust would be
formed and the smart contract and its investors would, as an entity, be
entitled to limited liability, entity shielding, capital lock-in, and legal
personhood. The smart contract would be a legally immortal being;
the smart contract would be a person.
Returning to the above ICO example,230 the ICO smart contract
manages the assets on behalf of all the owners of the tokens sold
through the ICO. The smart contract could be designed to act as the
trustee in the business trust. The tokenholders would act as the certifi-
cate-holders-they have contributed funds in exchange for tokens.
The tokens often give the holder the right to consume some service,
but they are also freely transferable and some holders may opt to re-
tain the token instead of redeeming it for services to reap a higher
payout upon sale later. The company offering the ICO, especially if
the company retains tokens, would also constitute a certificate-holder
in the business trust. The smart contract manages the tokens for the
benefit and profit of all the tokenholders, including the company and
new purchasers. ICOs often sport legal documentation, such as a sales
contract, documenting the terms of the token purchase and any rights
to which the tokenholder will be entitled.2 31 Properly designed, such
sales contracts, or another contract signed at the time of sale, could
fulfill the trust instrument requirement for creating a common-law
business trust. ICOs could be organized, then, as decentralized busi-
ness trusts.232
D. DAOs as Business Trusts
The requirements for recognizing a business trust also map well
to the possible design of a DAO. The complex smart contract, or
group of interacting smart contracts, that comprise the DAO's code
serve as the business trust, holding the trust property in the form of
digital assets. The DAO would have at least two levels of
230 See supra notes 129-41 and accompanying text.
231 See, e.g., STORJ, STORJ LABS (BVI) LTD. TERMS OF TOKEN SALE (2017), https://storj.io/
sale-terms.pdf [https://perma.cc/JZ6B-MBNT].
232 Recognizing that many of the ICOs undertaken to date may not fit this construct be-
cause they were not coded with this framework in mind, the details of how an ICO would be
organized in order to qualify as a decentralized business trust and the legal ramifications of
doing so are further explored in the third article in this three-part series.
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tokenholders. The first level of tokenholders exchange cryptocurrency
for tokens that (a) represent the holder's proportional ownership in-
terest in the business trust, and (b) grant the holders the right only to
vote on two issues: (1) who will act as trustees, and (2) whether to
change the fundamental structure of the DAO's code. I will refer to
these tokenholders as "certificate tokenholders" to reflect their equiv-
alence to certificate holders in the business trust. The certificate
tokenholders will grant elected trustees a second level of tokens-
trustee tokens. Trustee tokens do not relate to any proportional own-
ership interest, but rather allow the trustees to direct the activity of
the business trust: to select which products and services to bring to
market, to contract with service providers and vendors, and to dis-
tribute profits back to the certificate tokenholders. Only a trustee to-
ken, and not a certificate token, would be endowed with the right to
transfer or otherwise dispose of the DAO's property.
With this model, the DAO satisfies the requirement that the trust-
ees hold and manage trust property on behalf of and for the benefit of
the certificate holders. As to the trust instrument, arguably, the DAO
computer code itself may constitute the trust agreement. Recognizing,
however, that a debate exists as to whether a smart contract can stand
on its own as a legal contract under the common law of contracts,2 3 3 1
submit that such an outcome is not required. Presently, creators of
DAOs with sophisticated legal counsel sell tokens under the auspices
of a sales contract-a regular, legal-prose, written-word contract.2
Carefully constructed, such sales contracts-or another contract of-
fered together with the sales contract-with each investor in the DAO
could fulfill the role of a trust instrument. Under such circumstances,
the DAO's code would represent real-time performance of that con-
tract, rather than the contract itself.
Mapping a DAO to the Standard Oil Trust organization helps il-
luminate the idea of a DAO as a business trust. In the case of a DAO
operating on Ethereum, the underlying protocol plays the role of the
individual Standard Oil Company. The ether held by individual DAO
investors acts like the stock held by owners of each Standard Oil
Company. The owners of ether transfer the ether to the DAO, just as
the owners of the Standard Oil Companies transferred their stock to
the Standard Oil Trust. Thus, the ether-holders become beneficiaries
233 For research regarding the enforceability of smart contracts under the common law of
contracts, see Max Raskin, The Law and Legality of Smart Contracts, 1 GEO. L. TECH. REv. 305,
321-40 (2017); Werbach & Cornell, supra note 34, at 338-82.
234 See, e.g., STOR, supra note 231.
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of the DAO, the same way that Standard Oil Company stockholders
became Standard Oil Trust beneficiaries. The beneficiaries receive
one DAO token for a prespecified amount of ether, just as the Stan-
dard Oil Trust beneficiaries received one trust certificate for every
$100 of stock contributed to the trust. The tokens give the benefi-
ciaries the right to profits (or rewards) from the activities of the DAO
and the right to elect the managers of the DAO, but beneficiaries have
no right to direct the operation of the DAO. The elected managers are
the trustees. This is the same split between ownership and manage-
ment that occurred between the beneficiaries and the nine-member
board of trustees in the Standard Oil Trust. This construction of a
DAO to match the business-trust form pioneered by the Standard Oil
Trust would not be difficult to achieve in context of current DAOs.2 35
Take, for example, the SuperDAO, which emerged after the fail-
ure of The DAO. 236 According to its creators, "SuperDAO is a decen-
tralized autonomous organization that encapsulates the advantages of
a traditional startup with the best attributes of crowd swarming dy-
namics and intelligence."237 The SuperDAO is stateful and uses an
"onion [layer] model" of governance, that is, one with multiple lay-
ers.23 8 Owners of the "Superneum" token possess management capac-
ity, intended to "steer[] the organization according to the goals and
mission established at inception."239 Meanwhile, an internal team un-
dertakes "every day decisions" related to product development via
"reputational voting." 2 4 0 The design of the SuperDAO "incentivizes
235 I recognize that not all DAOs are structured this way today. Further, DAOs created in
the future are not subject to any requirement of being structured this way. Any DAO not struc-
tured this way that is not incorporated or formed as an LLC will be ineligible to take advantage
of an entity form that offers the advantages of limited liability and legal personhood. The point is
that the business trust should be an option in a DAO's (and other DBEs') choice of entity
analysis.
236 About, SUPERDAO, https://superdao.io/#About [https://perma.cc/T6VC-2VDS].
237 Ola, On SuperDAO: Simple Overview of An Efficient DAO, SUPERDAO BLOG (Jan.
27, 2017), https://blog.superdao.io/on-superdao-simple-overview-of-an-efficient-dao-
73efc7 43 6 2
al [https:/perma.ccl9A2M-PMJV].
238 Id.
239 Id. The SuperDAO refers to this initial mission of the SuperDAO as the "constititution-
aIDNA." Id. The idea is that by coding the mission into the SuperDAO, it "can be referenced
within the DAO during an organizational proceeding to enforce rules and deter harmful behav-
ior not conducive to the set purpose of the DAO." Id. The Superneum tokenholders have "abso-
lute power over any decision as long as its proposals are not anti-missionary to SuperDAO." Id.
240 Id. These "merit" holders make up "a committee (supercom) of ALL active working
participant[s] earning 'Merits' for impact based contributions." Id. These are then "[s]ubdivided
into 'minicoms' or sub committees that specialize in domain specific decision making. These
could represent Dapp teams, financial analyst[s], human resources and so forth." Id. If the sub-
committees have disputes, the full-committee consensus will settle the dispute. Id.
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active participators with a higher skewed payout within a short value
(profit) distribution event timeline and punishes apathetic participa-
tor[s] with lower payouts."2 4 1 Nevertheless, this sounds very much like
a director (Superneum) and officer/employee (merits) split. Or, in
business-trust form, the Superneum tokenholders might be considered
the trustees, and the merits-holders a third layer of workers hired by
the trustees.
However, writings on the SuperDAO imply that, depending on
participation levels, both Superneum and merits tokenholders can re-
ceive profits from the excess value earned by SuperDAO products and
services.242 To make the business-trust form map well to the
SuperDAO, the creators would need a third layer of tokens-the cer-
tificate tokens. So, if the Superneum tokenholders only had the right
to vote on who should hold an intermediate level of tokens or on
whether to change the SuperDAO constitutionalDNA, Superneum
tokenholders would be equivalent to certificate tokenholders. Those
elected to hold the intermediate level of tokens-the trustee tokens-
would retain the right to direct the management of the enterprise
within the confines of the SuperDAO constitutionalDNA, and the
merits tokenholders could remain Contractors approved by the trus-
tee tokenholders.
Ultimately, the SuperDAO would retain its onion-layer checks
and balances on operational decisionmaking and could still incentivize
production with an award of value. The difference is that under the
current structure, unless the creators of the SuperDAO elect to incor-
porate the SuperDAO under the law of a specific jurisdiction, the
SuperDAO arguably represents a partnership, with many smaller part-
nerships formed as decentralized applications surface, because the
Superneum tokenholders and merits tokenholders are both entitled to
a share in the profits and to control the direction of the enterprise.
The common law views this as a partnership rather than a business
trust.2 4 3 Under the modifications proposed here, the SuperDAO could
be viewed as a business trust, the Superneum tokenholders would en-
joy limited liability, and the SuperDAO would enjoy entity shielding
and legal personhood.
241 Id. Right to profits from the SuperDAO is tied to "[a] minimum criteria for participa-
tion." Id.
242 See id.
243 See Goldwater v. Oltman, 292 P. 624, 628 (Cal. 1930); Roberts v. Aberdeen-S. Pines
Syndicate, 151 S.E. 865 (N.C. 1930).
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Similarly, returning to our case study of the Plantoid,244 the Plan-
toid DAO represents a commercial venture designed to build wealth
for the Plantoid and for those contributing to the Plantoid over
time.245 For the Plantoid's DAO to operate as a business trust, the
Plantoid smart contracts serve as trustees, holding title and managing
the property of the Plantoid for the benefit and profit of the Plan-
toid.24 6 As a result, the certificate-holders in the Plantoid DAO are the
artists commissioned to create Plantoid reproductions. Importantly,
the artists do not themselves direct the DAO in its choice between
reproduction proposals. Rather, the individuals that sent appreciation
funds to the Plantoid receive the right to vote on which artist to com-
mission for the next reproduction.24 7 In other words, when individuals
purchase services from the Plantoid by sending the Plantoid
cryptocurrency, the services being purchased are (1) a gesture of ap-
preciation from the Plantoid and (2) the right to vote on the reproduc-
tion proposal at some future date when sufficient funds exist for
reproduction. Meanwhile, the certificate-holders in each Plantoid bus-
iness trust received their share in exchange for a contribution of la-
bor-the artistic reproduction of the Plantoid. As a result, a Plantoid
with a trust agreement could fulfill the requirements of a common-law
business trust. The result would be that the artists would enjoy limited
liability, the Plantoid and its DAO would enjoy legal personality, and
the contracts that the Plantoid enters into with humans would enjoy
the benefit of a legally recognized entity on either side of the contract.




IV. LESSONS FROM HISTORY FOR DECENTRALIZED BUSINESS
TRUSTS AND THE LAW
Technology innovation frequently spurs innovation in business
forms. History foreshadows the use of the business trust in the context
of DBEs, but the antitrust concerns that arose in connection with
244 See supra notes 146-55 and accompanying text.
245 The purpose of the DAO is to accumulate sufficient funds that the Plantoid can
reproduce. Each time the Plantoid reproduces, it sends a 1% royalty to the Plantoid from which
it originates. See Pyramid Scheme, OKHAos, http://okhaos.com/plantoids/ [http://okhaos.com/
plantoids] (explaining that under the smart-contract terms comprising each Plantoid DAO, "the
artists commissioned with the (re)production of a plantoid will not only receive the bitcoins
collected by the plantoid that commissioned them (as an ex-ante lump-sum payment), but also a
small proportion of the funds collected by all the plantoids they created").
246 See id.; see also Caffyn, supra note 151.
247 See Pyramid Scheme, OKHAos, supra note 245.
248 A Bionic Creature, supra note 146.
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nineteenth-century business trusts do not carry the same significance
in the DBE context. The preeminent concern in this context is the
effect that DBEs may have on corporate culture, calling for both the
law and software developers to anticipate that effect and account for it
as they build DBEs.
A. History Foreshadows DBE Use of the Business-Trust Form
In the early days of colonial exploration and mercantilism, entre-
preneurs sought royal charters for each voyage.2 4 9 As seafaring tech-
nology improved and the likelihood of returning from an expedition
alive increased, royal charters began granting monopolies over large
swaths of territory to enable multiple voyages.2 50 Such charters gave
rise to important historical entities like the East India Trading Com-
pany and the world's oldest multinational corporation, the Hudson's
Bay Company.251 Facing the notorious difficulty of obtaining such
charters, many businesses turned to unincorporated business organi-
zation forms that offered at least some of the same advantages of the
corporation, including limited liability for partners not directly in-
volved in day-to-day management of the business.2 5 2 Business ven-
tures in the newly created United States of America experienced
similar development of business organization forms-state govern-
ments issued corporate charters,253 but the difficulty in obtaining them
and the tendencies of fickle legislatures to revoke them drove business
ventures to less restrictive business forms.254
The new technology that emerged in the nineteenth century, in-
cluding railroads, telegraph lines, and increasingly efficient oil produc-
tion, brought the need for an alternative method of securing
incorporation into sharp relief as invention and entrepreneurship out-
paced the law's ability to enable economic stability.255 Business ven-
tures, powered by the new technology of the time, created integrated
industrial firms with economies of scale that struggled against the
249 See MICKLETWArr & WOOLDRIDGE, supra note 14, at 20-21.
250 See id. at 17.
251 Id.
252 See id. at 40.
253 D. GORDON SMITH & CYNHIA A. WILLIAMS, BusINEss ORGANIZATIONS 176 (3d ed.
2012) ("Prior to the widespread adoption of general incorporation statutes in the mid-1800s,
corporations in the United States were formed only by legislative action, usually by a state
legislature.").
254 See MICKLETHWAIT & WOOLDRIDGE, supra note 14, at 43-44.
255 Cf id. at 49.
2019] 419
THE GEORGE WASHINGTON LAW REVIEW
overly restrictive general corporation laws of the day.2 5 6 As Rockefel-
ler showed the way, businesses increasingly turned to the business
trust over the corporation because it offered the benefits of incorpora-
tion without imposing most of its undue restrictions.2 5 7 Over time,
however, business trusts amassed too much power for regulatory com-
fort,258 and the law lag that drove businesses to the trust form became
increasingly apparent. As a result, states adopted general incorpora-
tion statutes, enabling the more simple and direct procedures for in-
corporating a business organization still enjoyed today.259 Technology,
however, continues to push the boundaries of business organization
law.
At the dawn of the twentieth century, the biggest corporations
suffered from a strictly hierarchical structure, with most ownership
and managerial power resting in the hands of a few.2 60 As those few
began to fall away, visionaries like Alfred Sloan at General Motors
sought to decentralize corporate structures.261 Sloan split the various
elements of General Motors into separate, autonomous divisions de-
fined by the market that they served.26 2 These divisions, of course, still
found themselves guided by a "powerful general office," leading to a
"controlled decentralization" structure, rather than a fully decentral-
ized one.2 6 3
This revolutionary system led to the rise of professional manag-
ers.2 64 The resulting
potential conflict of interest between the "principals" who
own companies and their "agents," who run them, which was
256 See id. at 65-66; see also Collins, supra note 5, at 2312-15 (describing restrictive nature
of the first general corporation laws).
257 See MICKLETHWAIT & WooLDRIDGE, supra note 14, at 67; Collins, supra note 5, at
2315-16 ("But since a trust was not technically a corporation, it did not require a state grant to
exist, was not subject to the state regulation of corporations, and was not prohibited from hold-
ing stock in multiple corporations in multiple states."); Rutledge & Schaefer, supra note 193, at
87.
258 See Collins, supra note 5, at 2321-28; cf Rutledge & Schaefer, supra note 193, at 89
n.25.
259 SMr & WILLIAMS, supra note 253, at 177 ("The old system was displaced through the
passage of general incorporation statutes-'general' because any eligible person could form a
corporation without a special act of the legislature. Over time the requirements for incorpora-
tion have become exceedingly simple."); Collins, supra note 5, at 2329-30.
260 Cf ]ICKLETHWArr & WOOLDRIDGE, supra note 14, at 103-04 (referring to the robber
barons as those with overwhelming economic and managerial power until the twentieth century).
261 Id. at 105.
262 Id. at 105-06.
263 Id. at 105.
264 Id. at 108.
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later dubbed the agency problem, has dogged the history of
the company, . . .with shareholders repeatedly trying to find
ways to make managers' interests the same as their own
(most recently with share options) and managers usually
wriggling out of them.2 65
As the twentieth century came to a close, the emergence of the in-
ternet led to further unbundling of the corporation.2 66 "By the end of
the twentieth century, you could see the gradual Siliconization of com-
merce. The hierarchies of big firms everywhere became looser."267
Technology giants of the twenty-first century continued to flatten
corporate-governance models in certain spheres of the economy. Am-
azon's internet sales disrupted retail-business structures;268 "fintech"
companies pushed competition into the financial industry,269 and
video-streaming services ended the days of big-box DVD-rental
stores.2 7 0 Just as the first DLT protocol (the Bitcoin blockchain)
emerged in 2009, the Sharing Economy hit mainstream, with compa-
nies like Uber, Lyft, and Airbnb striving to "democratiz[e] how we
produce, consume, govern, and solve social problems."271 Sharing
Economy businesses experiment with organizational models that "re-
duce the need for capital-intensive infrastructure (such as hotels) and
durable goods (such as cars)" because spaces and goods can be shared
locally.272 The Sharing Economy represents another technological in-
novation challenging the present understanding of the nature and pur-
pose of the firm. 2 7 3
The Sharing Economy's roots lie in peer-to-peer systems. Peer-
to-peer systems are "based on distributed power and distributed ac-
265 Id. at xviii.
266 Id. at 142-43.
267 Id. at 145.
268 Panos Mourdoukoutas, Who Killed Sears' Business Model?, FoRBEs (Jan. 5, 2017, 3:56
PM), https://www.forbes.com/sites/panosmourdoukoutas/2017/01/05/who-killed-sears-business-
model/ [https://perma.cc/Z7QP-R9UA] ("[Amazon's] remote location warehouses, expedient de-
livery and razor-thin margins have given Amazon a price advantage over Sears, further com-
pressing its operating margins.").
269 The Fintech Revolution, ECONOMIST (May 9, 2015), http://www.economist.comlnews/
leaders/21650546-wave-startups-changing-financefor-better-fintech-revolution [https://perma.cc/
Y39P-DZSN].
270 Brian Stelter, Internet Kills the Video Store, N.Y. TIMEs (Nov. 6, 2013), http://www.ny
times.com/2013/11/07/business/medialinternet-kills-the-video-store.html [https://perma.cc/88XF-
8QQ5].
271 About, supra note 167.
272 Stemler, supra note 166, at 202.
273 See, e.g., supra note 169.
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cess to resources."274 Further, peer-to-peer systems generally allow an-
yone to participate in their networks, rather than limit access to a
select few. 2 7 5 Finally, peer-to-peer systems distribute knowledge
among all users, rather than centralize knowledge in the hands of a
managerial group.276 Blockchain-based systems take the peer-to-peer
inroads made by the Sharing Economy to their logical conclusion.27 7
DBEs, residing on a DLT protocol, therefore represent the next wave
of corporate decentralization technology. Business trusts are the flexi-
ble form historically turned to when entrepreneurs using the new
technology of their time want greater flexibility without losing the
benefits of the corporate form. The emergence of decentralized busi-
ness trusts should not, therefore, come entirely as a surprise. If Rocke-
feller were a coder and his Standard Oil enterprise were a DBE, he
would have created a decentralized business trust. As a result, the idea
that the emergence of decentralized business trusts will also give rise
to new concerns should also not come as a surprise. Rockefeller's
Standard Oil Trust did, after all, become the monopoly that inspired
modem antitrust law. Rather, we (and Rockefeller) might be sur-
prised by the type of concerns resulting from the emergence of DBEs.
B. Decentralized Business Trusts Are Unlikely Candidates for Next-
Generation Monopolies
The rise of the business trust in the nineteenth century enabled
business ventures to amass startling amounts of wealth and economic
power.2 7 8 The unexpected economic prowess of the business trust and
concerns regarding the effects on a market economy led to the enact-
ment of the Sherman Antitrust Act. 27 9 Several factors at play in the
DBE context, however, suggest that the recognition of decentralized
business trusts in the DBE context will not raise similar antitrust con-
274 ARUN SuNDARARA.TAN, THE SHARING EcoNouv 32-33 (2016) (quoting Michel
Bauwens).
275 See id. at 33.
276 Id.
277 See id. (noting that today's Sharing Economy represents a hybrid system of pure peer-
to-peer networks combined with more traditional economic spaces and that Blockchain more
purely fulfills Bauwens' three elements of peer-to-peer systems).
278 See Rutledge & Schaefer, supra note 193, at 88-89 ("while a corporation could not hold
shares in another corporation, no such limitation restricted the trust-a capacity that allowed
certain trusts to amass control over significant portions of commercial activity." (footnote
omitted)).
279 Id. at 89 & n.25 ("The title of the first federal legislation passed to protect competition,
namely the Sherman Antitrust Act, reflects widespread use of the form, exemplified by Rocke-
feller's Standard Oil Trust." (citing 15 §§ U.S.C. 1-38 (2012))).
422 [Vol. 87:373
IF ROCKEFELLER WERE A CODER
cerns. Specifically, the choice-of-entity motivation is different for
DBE entrepreneurs than it was for Rockefeller. Current uses of the
business trust demonstrate that when the right choice of entity moti-
vation is at play, business trusts can be, and are, used without giving
rise to antitrust concerns.
When Rockefeller conducted his choice-of-entity analysis, indus-
try integration served as his primary motivationm In other words,
Rockefeller set out to create a monopoly.281 In the DBE context, en-
trepreneurs will use the decentralized-business-trust form developed
in this Article to achieve limited-liability status and separate legal per-
sonhood without the practical constraints and misaligned policy of
other available business forms.m That the business-trust form offers
an item in the menu of entity forms is neither new nor unique to
DBEs. Business trusts are often the entity form of choice for mutual
funds, real estate investment ventures, and asset securitization.283
These industries do not use the business-trust form to build monopo-
lies. Trusts are used in asset securitization, for example, as a special-
purpose corporation that insulates assets from the risks associated
with their owner.28 More generally, Professor Steven Schwarcz con-
cludes that the deciding factor in the choice to use a business trust, as
opposed to a corporation, lies in the extent to which investors need to
place the assets of the business venture at risk.285 Under his analysis,
the business trust offers the better choice of entity where the goals of
both the business venture's creditors and owners center on preserving
the value of the assets rather than generating a risk-weighted return.86
This rationale holds true for DBEs at some levels of the technology
(particularly the smart contract and DAO levels), where the aim of the
venture rests in preserving the assets contributed to the venture .87
Further separating the motivation for using of the business trust
in the DBE context from Rockefeller's motivation of integrating an
industry is the possibility that, as an entity form available in some
280 See TARBELL, supra note 1, at 55.
281 See Collins, supra note 5, at 2315.
282 See supra Part III.
283 Rutledge & Schaefer, supra note 193, at 90; Schwarcz, Commercial Trusts as Business
Organizations, supra note 195, at 559 ("In a seeming incongruity, trusts have come to dominate
certain types of modem business and financial transactions.").
284 See Schwarcz, The Alchemy of Asset Securitization, supra note 195, at 135.
285 Schwarcz, Commercial Trusts as Business Organizations, supra note 195, at 561.
286 Id.
287 If the goal were a risk-weighted return, the participants would be better served by re-
taining the cryptocurrency for speculative trading, instead of trading it in for certificate tokens.
See id.
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states at common law, some DBEs may qualify as a business trust and
bear the hallmarks of a corporation as a result of purely private order-
ing through contract. This quality of decentralized business trusts may
contradict the sensibilities of many in the open-source DLT commu-
nity (especially at the protocol level) that presently strive to claim im-
munity from state-backed laws.2 8 In other words, at some levels of the
technology, DBEs will elect the business-trust form for the same per-
fectly acceptable reasons that asset securitization, mutual funds, and
real estate investment trusts do. At other levels of the technology
(particularly, the protocol level), DBEs may stumble into legal-entity
status through a contract that is given additional attributes by state
common law to their chagrin. In either case, neither the DBE nor its
creators intend to integrate the DLT industry the way Rockefeller in-
tended to integrate the oil-refinery industry. Nevertheless, the long
cycle of innovation in technology and business entities demonstrates
that both society and the law would benefit from anticipating new
challenges to arise from the emergence of decentralized business
trusts.
C. DBEs May Negatively Impact Corporate Culture
Monopolistic economic power may not be the negative external-
ity that follows decentralized business trusts, but history makes clear
that when technology fundamentally changes the nature of business
organization, both positive and negative effects on society are likely to
follow. For example, the improvements in sailing technology that ena-
bled royal charters to shift from approving one voyage to granting a
monopoly over unlimited voyages in a given geographic territory also
inexorably tied corporate pursuits to the imperialism of the day.28 9
Much later, using Alfred Sloan's GM as the prototype, the multidivi-
sional firm spread during the twentieth century,290 bringing with it a
"new culture of management" emphasizing professional standards and
288 This sentiment stems from a long line of cyber-separatists, beginning with John Perry
Barlow. See John Perry Barlow, A Declaration of the Independence of Cyberspace, ELECrRONIC
FRONTER Fouwn. (Feb. 8, 1996), https://www.eff.org/cyberspace-independence [https://perma
.cc/TLY6-8FSW] ("Governments of the Industrial World, you weary giants of flesh and steel, I
come from Cyberspace, the new home of Mind. On behalf of the future, I ask you of the past to
leave us alone. You are not welcome among us. You have no sovereignty where we gather.").
289 See MICKLETHWArr & WOOLDRIDGE, supra note 14, at 17-25 ("The sixteenth and sev-
enteenth centuries saw the emergence of some of the most remarkable business organizations
the world has seen: 'chartered companies' . . . . By the late seventeenth century the Company
was a well-organized monopoly, providing some E20,000 in customs duties to the crown. But it
was still a state monopoly-and one mired in politics.").
290 See id. at 104-06.
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company loyalty.291 Law and society responded to each of these devel-
opments. Royal monopolies like that granted to the East India Com-
pany became increasingly embroiled in politics-for example, the tea
monopoly granted to the East India Company sparked the Boston Tea
Party.292 The rise of a professional management class led to a slew of
corporate-governance regulations designed to address the perceived
agency costs created by the separation of ownership and manage-
ment.2 93 So what negative externality should we expect to follow de-
centralized business trusts? Because decentralized business trusts
extend the peer-to-peer efforts of the Sharing Economy to an extreme
degree, they may contribute to a gradual shift in corporate culture-
one that is arguably already underway.
Despite the powerful narrative of the Sharing Economy's benefits
for unlocking dead capital and enabling microentrepreneurship, evi-
dence of a less desirable cultural shift driven by the Sharing Economy
is mounting.294 One commentator, for example, describes a darker
side of the Sharing Economy as a world characterized by
a new form of surveillance where service workers must live
in fear of being snitched on,. . . marketplaces are generating
new and ever-more-entitled forms of consumption[,] . . .
[and] many Sharing Economy companies are making big
money for their investors and executives, and making good
jobs for their software engineers and marketers, by removing
the protections and assurances won by decades of struggle,
by creating riskier and more precarious forms of low-paid
work for those who actually work in the Sharing Economy.295
291 Id. at 109-10.
292 Id. at 27. The East India Company was also embroiled in the debate surrounding slav-
ery, which significantly impacted its sugar imports. Id.
293 See SMrrH & WILLIAMs, supra note 253, at 173-75, 175 (defining corporate-governance
law and linking it to "a separation of ownership (the shareholders) and control (the manage-
ment) in public corporations").
294 See, e.g., Benjamin Edelman, Michael Luca & Dan Svirsky, Racial Discrimination in the
Sharing Economy: Evidence from a Field Experiment, 9 AM. ECON. J. APPLIED ECON. 1, 1 (2017)
("[Gluests with distinctively African American names are 16 percent less likely to be accepted
relative to identical guests with distinctively white names."); Sofia Ranchordis, Does Sharing
Mean Caring? Regulating Innovation in the Sharing Economy, 16 MINN. J.L. Scl. & TECH. 413,
455-65 (2015) (describing negative aspects of the Sharing Economy and regulatory responses);
Brishen Rogers, The Social Costs of Uber, 82 U. CI. L. REv. DIALOGUE 85, 86 (2015) ("Uber's
longer-term impact on labor standards is quite unclear, however, and it may have dark implica-
tions for the future of low-wage work more generally."); Stemler, supra note 166, at 222-28
(describing market failures in the Sharing Economy and outlining possible related societal
harms).
295 TOM SLEE, WHAT'S YouRs is MINE: AGAINST THE SHAIUNG ECONOMY 10-11 (2015).
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This commentary on the Sharing Economy raises important questions
for decentralized business trusts because they arguably represent an
extension of the heightened decentralization of business embodied by
the Sharing Economy. As detailed above, the Sharing Economy's
roots lie in peer-to-peer systems. Blockchain-based systems take the
peer-to-peer inroads made by the Sharing Economy to their logical
conclusion.2 9 6 As such, will the externalities produced by DBEs re-
present the extreme version of the externalities now documented in
the Sharing Economy?
Many describe the potential of DBEs with the same altruistic
rhetoric as that surrounding the Sharing Economy. The founders of
the SuperDAO proclaim that the SuperDAO "encapsulates the advan-
tages of a traditional startup with the best attributes of crowd swarm-
ing dynamics and intelligence."297 A DLT-based system called
Backfeed even offers a solution to the negative aspects of the Sharing
Economy, declaring that "[w]ith Backfeed, every community member
is simultaneously a contributor and an actual shareholder in the ser-
vice provided by the community. Hence, everyone has an incentive to
maximise the value of that service, as the mo[re] successful it is, the
greater the potential benefits will be." 2 98 Others, however, predict
dangerous consequences for DBEs and other "algorithmic entities."299
Indeed, to the extent that the promise of DBEs for rectifying the neg-
ative aspects of the Sharing Economy depend on the fact that they
offer a new method for organically and efficiently tapping into the
wisdom of the crowd, evidence suggests that such wisdom is only as
robust as the crowd is diverse, independent, and decentralized. "
DBEs may further decentralize business ventures, whether in the
Sharing Economy or otherwise, but without correcting for deficiencies
in diversity and independence, DBEs will raise new challenges.
By way of illustration, consider the possible effects of a lack of
software-developer diversity on the one hand, and a lack of partici-
pant independence on the other. Computer code is a language that
manifests the culture, viewpoints, and biases of those who write it. o
296 See supra note 277 and accompanying text.
297 Ola, supra note 237.
298 Alex Pazaitis, Primavera De Filippi & Vasilis Kostakis, Blockchain and Value Systems in
the Sharing Economy: The Illustrative Case of Backfeed, 125 TECH. FORECASTING & Soc.
CHANGE 105, 110 (2017).
299 LoPucki, supra note 94, at 903-04 ("Entities without human collaborators could be
more ruthless, more difficult to deter, and easier to replicate.").
300 JAMEs SuRowIEcI, THE WISDOM OF CROWDS 22 (2004).
301 Danielle Keats Citron & Frank Pasquale, The Scored Society: Due Process for Auto-
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Compounding this reality, extensive literature discusses the effects of
the lack of corporate-board diversity.302 If the trustees of DBEs are
self-selected, without any way to ensure diversity, DBEs may be less
able to attend to the needs of their broad participant base than in-
tended,33 may not optimize financial performance,3 0 4 and may experi-
ence diminished decision-making capacity.305 DBEs that do not
consider mechanisms for ensuring diversity and independence of par-
ticipants may thus represent legally recognized business entities with
biases engrained into their organizational framework and managed by
trustees concerned with only a small number of stakeholder groups.
Such DBEs may be more susceptible to problems of groupthink while
also operating on a decentralized system and scale previously consid-
ered impossible. Such circumstances hold clear potential for embed-
ding biases, discrimination, and other less desirable qualities into
decentralized business trusts, and calls for the creators of such systems
to consider building corporate-governance mechanisms patterned af-
ter existing laws into the "constitutionalDNA" of DBEs.3 06
mated Predictions, 89 WASH. L. REV. 1, 4 (2014) (describing the process by which human biases
are embedded into the source code of predictive algorithms); see also FRANK PASQUALE, THE
BLACK Box SocrEry 110-13 (2015).
302 See Deborah L. Rhode & Amanda K. Packel, Diversity on Corporate Boards: How
Much Difference Does Difference Make?, 39 DEL. J. CoRP. L. 377, 382-401 (2014) (surveying the
literature).
303 Maretno Harjoto, Indrarini Laksmana & Robert Lee, Board Diversity and Corporate
Social Responsibility, 132 J. Bus. ETrmcs 641, 641 (2015) (finding an association between
stronger corporate social responsibility performance and board diversity).
304 See, e.g., David A. Carter, Betty J. Simkins & W. Gary Simpson, Corporate Governance,
Board Diversity, and Firn Value, 38 FN. REV. 33, 33 (2003) ("[W]e find significant positive
relationships between the fraction of women or minorities on the board and firm value."). Other
studies do not find a positive relationship, and still others find no statistical significance. See
Rhode & Packel, supra note 302, at 383-90.
305 Rhode & Packel, supra note 302, at 393 ("A common argument by scholars, as well as
board members of both sexes, is that diversity enhances board decision-making and monitoring
functions."); see also SuRowmauc~, supra note 300, at 36 ("The positive case for diversity, as
we've seen, is that it expands a group's set of possible solutions and allows the group to concep-
tualize problems in novel ways. The negative case for diversity is that diversity makes it easier
for a group to make decisions based on facts, rather than on influence, authority, or group alle-
giance. Homogeneous groups, particularly small ones, are often victims of what the psychologist
Irving Janis called 'groupthink."').
306 This is an area clearly ripe for applying the principles of cryptolaw for DLT to the de-
sign of DBEs. Transplanting business trusts to DLT protocols requires considering the role of
corporate law and ways to build similar functions into the code governing DBEs to increase the
likely success of the transplant and minimize its likelihood of generating unexpected and unde-
sirable effects.
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CONCLUSION
This Article contributes to a new and developing legal discourse
regarding DLT by exploring the impact of transplanting business or-
ganization law to DLT-based business ventures. Like many businesses
that relied on prior technological innovations, DLT-based business
ventures struggle to find an optimal business organization form among
the current menu of entities. This Article reveals that careful attention
to both law and code may enable DAOs, smart contracts, and DLT
protocols to resolve that tension and enjoy the same limited liability,
capital lock-in, and legal personhood enjoyed by their corporate coun-
terparts without being forced to take on a form that ill fits for both
practical and doctrinal reasons.
The argument that certain DBEs can be structured as business
trusts raises significant legal issues to be explored in future work. For
example, recognizing certain smart contracts as legal business entities
raises a host of new legal questions to be explored in the realm of
ICOs. Rather than settle the law in this area, DBEs may further com-
plicate the legal treatment of ICOs. Federal securities laws may view
business trust certificates as securities under the Securities Act of
1933307 and the Securities Exchange Act of 1934.308 State laws vary,
but at least some states subject business trust certificates to regulation
under their blue sky laws because they apply the full panoply of cor-
porate rights and responsibilities to business trusts.309 Rather than
ending the legal inquiry, this treatment of business trust certificates
raises a new set of substantive legal issues to investigate. If a smart
contract generates the certificates sold, acts as the sole trustee of the
assets exchanged for the tokens, and the smart contract runs on an
open-source protocol that can no longer be dominated by a single en-
tity, who would federal securities laws or state blue-sky laws look to as
the issuer of the token? Will the laws really require a smart contract to
register with the SEC or the state government to sell securities? Can
307 See 15 U.S.C. § 77b(a)(1) (2012).
308 15 U.S.C. § 78c(a)(10) (2012). At least one commentator is more certain that "[a] busi-
ness trust certificate would qualify as a 'security' under" these laws and certain others, including
"the Public Utility Holding Company Act of 1935, 15 U.S.C. § 79(a)(16) (1988); the Trust Inden-
ture Act of 1939, 15 U.S.C. § 77ccc(16) (1988); and the Investment Company Act of 1940, 15
U.S.C. § 80a-2(a)(36) (1988)." Takemi Ueno, Defining a "Business Trust": Proposed Amendment
of Section 101(9) of the Bankruptcy Code, 30 HARV. J. ON LEGIs. 499, 513 n.96 (1993). Such
certainty would be a step closer to a bright-line rule than that presented in the SEC's ruling on
The DAO, while remaining true to that ruling's characterization of The DAO as an "unincorpo-
rated organization." See The DAO Report, supra note 140, at *43.
309 See, e.g., Rubens v. Costello, 251 P.2d 306, 310 (Ariz. 1952); Pac. Am. Realty Tr. v.
Lonctot, 381 P.2d 123, 125 (Wash. 1963).
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compliance with such regimes be built into the code before the smart
contract initiates the ICO? What policy reasons would the SEC have
to enforce securities laws against the smart contract? These issues call
for deeper exploration and hint at the broader ramifications of DBEs
for DLT governance.
Further, the tendency of DBEs to complicate substantive legal
issues may, perhaps counterintuitively, allow for greater clarity in the
continued quest to understand the nature and purpose of the firm.
The firm, in its many forms, is a complex entity. DBEs illuminate that
complexity, and mapping DBEs to business trusts using a methodol-
ogy rooted in systems analysis offers the analytical space to embrace
and explore that complexity. DBEs should also be expected to impact
corporate culture by producing new negative externalities. While it is
possible that changes to a DBE's code may correct for such negative
cultural changes, business-organization and corporate-governance
laws have been developing for just that purpose for quite some time.
Rather than reinvent the wheel, DBEs should be encouraged to look
to existing state-backed law that might be transplanted into DBE
structures.
Ultimately, identifying decentralized business trusts as an alterna-
tive business-entity form for DBEs offers the potential to reorient
models of the firm toward organizations offering greater transparency,
stronger endogenous feedback loops, and increased cultural and socie-
tal responsiveness. Realizing that potential requires anticipating the
ripple effects that recognizing computer code as a legal entity will
have on adjacent areas of law. This Article offers a starting point in
that regard and calls for further interdisciplinary research at the inter-
section of business organization law and DLT. In so doing, the Article
both contributes to a growing literature considering the impact of al-
gorithmic entities and stands as a reminder that the relationship be-
tween law and code is a fluid, multidirectional relationship. The
emergence of new computer-code structures may influence the trajec-
tory of the law, but the law also influences the trajectory of the code.
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